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Introduction 
The Yugoslav war of succession (I 99 I- I 995) was 
a civil war and an international war, stimulated by 
various outside interventions. Its proximate cause 
was the disintegration of the SFRY. The principal 
question about its termination was what pattern of 
ethnic and political relations would arise in place of 
this federation. Whether that question has been 
adequately answered by the Dayton and Paris 
Agreements remains to be seen. 
Through lack of ability or will on the part of 
numerous parties, and the exercise of organised 
force and related means for political ends, some 
three million people who were living in former 
Yugoslavia when the crisis first assumed propor-
tions threatening to peace and stability, in I 990, 
became displaced persons or refugees in or outside 
their country of origin. At least two hundred and 
fifty thousand soldiers and militia were killed, 
though other estimates suggest that including 
civilians as many as a million may have died, many 
of them killed outright or tortured then murdered in 
gross and bestial ways in their own homes, or in 
execution grounds not far away from where they 
lived. Despite all pretences to the contrary, and all 
honest efforts to prevent it, 'ethnic cleansing' has 
prevailed. (Woodward I 995a:350-53) 
Serbia remains ascendant in Vojvodina, Kosovo, 
and northern and eastern Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
where ethnic minorities and/or their rights have 
been suppressed, and continues to control part of 
eastern Slavonfja. With Montenegro, Serbia in I 993 
formed the FRY, which is now gaining interna-
tional recognition as the successor state of the 
SFRY. The FRY remains an ethnically 
heterogenous society, but it must face critical 
internal tensions over relations between the domi-
nant Serb-Montenegrin majority and the large 
Albanian minority, which in the province of 
Kosovo constitutes a potentially secessionist 
majority of formidable proportions. (Table 3) 
Croatia has expelled most of its once-large Serb 
minority population, and shows no appetite for re-
admitting them as the Dayton Accords and the 
more recent agreement on recognition between 
Croatia and the FRY both provide. Those who 
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remain have had their separate national status 
removed, and their civil rights substantially cur-
tailed, except in the part of eastern Slavonija still 
controlled by Serbs. The history of the Serbs in 
Croatia is one of bitter tragedy, added to the 
massacres perpetrated against them during the 
Second World War. Numbering between 650,000 
and I ,200,000 before the recent war, depending 
whether one counts those living in emigration with 
Yugoslav citizenship and presumptive rights to live 
in Croatia through place of birth or family connec-
tions, they have experienced systematic and 
forcible expulsion. Legislated changes ofCroatian 
citizenship laws have made many of them stateless 
persons, refugees, and victims of crimes against 
the laws of war. Yet it has been said that their fate 
was not ethnic cleansing. (Galbraith 1995) 
The sovereignty of the Bosnian government and 
the integrity of its territorial boundaries, always 
theoretical, are now widely acknowledged to be 
figments of the western liberal mind. The Dayton 
Accords rely upon the 'strategic consent' given by 
president Milosevic of Serbia to the deployment of 
!FOR by NATO, and expressly recognise the 
Bosnian-Serb entity RS alongside 'Bosnia and 
Hercegovina' (no longer 'The Republic ofBosnia-
Hercegovina'). Yet the Slav-Muslims in Bosnia, 
over two million people at the beginning of the 
crisis, have established their own Bosnian state for 
the first time, and many regard it as the nucleus of 
a Bosnia that will one day attain sovereignty over 
the entire country. Unless one presumes a stagger-
ingly rapid reconciliation among peoples and 
leaders who were so recently savagely fighting, it 
is impossible to see how this goal could be attained 
without further warfare. Nonetheless, all evidence 
to the contrary, supporters of 'Bosnia' remained 
unconvinced that it never possessed the credentials 
or resources to sustain the independence so 
casually granted by the international community. 
(Macdonald 1994;Malcolm 1996) 
The Bosnian-Croat Federation, controlling fifty-
one per cent of Bosnia-Hercegovina, is held 
together by enmity against the Bosnian Serbs, and 
by American and German backing. As intense 
antagonism between Croats and Slav-muslims over 
the city of Mostar in western Hercegovina ill us-
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trates, this 'federation' is a fictitious sham, in-
vented for higher strategic purposes; within it, 
therefore, a struggle continues between Croats and 
'Bosniaks' for predominance within various 
regions of the country, with the Croats aiming, like 
the Serbs of the RS, to an eventual union or at least 
a constitutional integration with Croatia, while the 
'Bosniaks' struggle against the Croats- who 
effectively control about a quarter of Bosnia, fly 
the Croatian flag and transact business in the 
national currency of Croatia, the Kuna - so as to 
preserve their precarious independent political 
existence. (Woodward 1995a:338-9) 
These political outcomes must be regarded as 
provisional and unstable because they are mutually 
contradictory. To some extent such contradictions 
can be regarded as fruitful ambiguity. But if the 
men and women who began and ran this war 
continue to exercise predominant influence then 
fighting is likely to break out again, once the 
various sides have recovered from present losses 
and gained new strength, and if support for robust 
peace enforcement wanes. For example, many 
Croat extreme nationalists want to absorb most of 
Bosnia, attaining again the limits of the wartime 
First Independent State. Many Serbs want the FRY 
to become an ethnically pure state. The Bosniaks 
are largely, and rightly, outraged that the promises 
made by their American sponsors have amounted 
to so little after so much sacrifice. With the 
Albanians (and Turks) ofKosovo-Metohia as allies 
in a common cause they might seek to destabilise 
the surrounding, much weakened, structures of 
Serbdom - and could even turn against their Croat 
partners. Hence making the peace work is not 
simply a matter of pursuing war crimes through 
the Hague Tribunal. The Serbs themselves, if their 
1strategic consent' in Bosnia is threatened, could 
undermine the entire Dayton framework. (Neville-
Jones 1996:47-53) 
For the time being, however, the most obvious 
consequence of the war has been a grand-strategic 
compromise between Croatia and Serbia, reflected 
in the August 1996 agreement on mutual recogni-
tion between Croatia and the FRY. (Belgrade 
1996:3-6) This leaves the former in control of all 
its own territories and much of Hercegovina and 
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western. Bosnia, though the issues of eastern 
Slavonija, the status of Brcko and the Posavino 
corridor, and control over the Prevlaka peninsula 
close to Dubrovnik, remain to be settled by nego-
tiation. Serbia controls most of eastern 
Hercegovina and eastern and north-eastern Bosnia, 
and tacitly claims a 'strategic purview' over part of 
eastern Slavonia. The constitutional ties to the 
FRY, permitted to the RS under the Dayton 
arrangements, are now most unlikely to be chal-
lenged, whatever efforts the US puts into Bosnian 
'unification'. The Slav-Muslim 'Bosniaks' have 
thus been left the symbols but not the substance of 
power in Bosnia, graphically illustrated by the open 
conspiracy through which some 300,000 'addi-
tional' votes were suddenly found by the OSCE in 
the September I 996 election 'contest' in order to 
make Alija Izetbegovic first president of the new 
inter-ethnic presidency. In actuality what remains 
ofBosnia for the Bosniaks is a land-locked mini-
state based on Sarajevo, plus whatever guns and 
money the Americans leave behind when their 
period of 'peace-enforcement' expires. 
Efforts to rebuild the countries shattered by this 
war and its attendant economic sanctions will 
continue to demand the close involvement of the 
UN, EU, and other institutionalised forms of the 
international community for an indefinite number 
of years to come. That is an intentional but risky 
political consequence of the way the war was 
limited in crucial respects by outside interventions. 
At the same time would-be peacemakers constantly 
find themselves returning to a model of loose 
federal and close inter-communal arrangements 
among closely kindred south Slavs. If years of 
patient understanding and many billions of money 
succeed in maintaining this peace then the rebuilt 
region will resemble what was Yugoslavia, but 
without its territorial-ethnic heterogeneity. If that 
does not happen war may again ravage the region, 
fought for unconditional rather than limited aims. 
(Neville-Jones 1996:53-62) Hence the meaning and 
consequences of the war will continue to be 
debated for many years. In an earlier paper I 
outlined the international and domestic course of 
the war; but here the main focus is the period 
before violence erupted. (Macdonald 1996) 
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Historical and other features of the 
SFRY 
The SFRY was established in 1945. It succeeded 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, torn apart by invasion 
and civil war in 1 941. It remains debatable how 
many died in that struggle, and who was responsi-
ble for killing whom. But during the Second World 
War in Europe parallels for the sometimes intensive 
but always extensive killing in wartime Yugoslavia 
can be found only in Poland, through the Holo-
caust, and in some of the battles of the German-
Soviet War. Josip Broz Tito and his communist 
partisans emerged triumphant in this charnel house, 
supported by Churchill and Roosevelt as well as by 
Stalin. 
The self-image of the SFRY stood for the 
transcendence of civil war and nationalism through 
socialist federalism and eventual communism. But 
despite copying Stalin's constitution and other 
methods, Tito broke with the Soviet Union in 1948. 
From that time the SFRY received strategic 
assistance from the western powers, including 
notably the US. In the more relaxed era of super-
power detente the SFRY joined western economic 
institutions, and Yugoslavs spread abroad to many 
western countries in search of employment. Their 
remittances, and the fact that Yugoslavia provided a 
bargain holiday destination for millions of tourists, 
provided a veneer of modernity and prosperity in 
what remained, none the less, a society based on a 
comparatively small and not very advanced indus-
trial sector, with a large and inefficient agricultural 
sector. Yugoslavia's industrial sector was heavily 
focused on military defence against a perceived 
Soviet threat, on internal trade, and on a few 
resource-extractive and other industries capable of 
earning hard currency. Through time a marked and 
growing divergence appeared between the level of 
development of different regions within Yugoslavia. 
(Woodward I 995b:351-60; Table 15) 
Under general constitutional provisions since 
Tito's death, each of the six constituent republics 
and two autonomous provinces - Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina), and 
Slovenia - nominated one representative to serve on 
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the collective presidency. The chairman of this 
body was nominated by the LCY. The president 
served for one year before handing over to his 
successor. By convention each of the eight feder-
ally represented units took the presidency of the 
federation in turn. The federal prime minister acted 
as chairman of the executive 'cabinet' of the 
federation, and as Commander-in-Chief (ie. as the 
authorising civilian authority) of the federal armed 
forces. The JNA, whose ethos and explicit consti-
tutional duty included defence of the federation and 
of Yugoslavism, was represented independently in 
SFRY federal councils as, in effect, federal de-
fence minister, the post being held by a senior 
nominee of the High Command. Each of the 
republics had its own militia forces, the TD, well 
equipped and trained, which were to act as peo-
ples' defence forces supplementary to, but also 
capable of acting autonomously from, the JNA. 
(Crnobrnja 1994:73-8; Tables 4-7) 
Through time and constitutional change, 
economic and political power devolved to the 
republics and autonomous provinces within the 
SFRY. These controlled the public sector enter-
prises on their territories; had their own republican 
banks; and legislated for their popu/ations subject 
to federal powers. Successive attempts were made 
to renovate republic-based economic and political 
divergences through Yugos/avism, an ideological 
language indulged in by the LCY. This suppressed 
direct discussion of nationalism, but used a 'na-
tional key' formula for representations which 
subserved its purposes and provided the opera-
tional code for the intra-republican and inter-
republican politics of the federation. In theory, 
therefore, the party ran the state in the name of all 
the people, and nations, nationalities and republics 
were subsidiary and dependent structures which 
would progressively give way to the developing 
structures of Yugoslavism in a socialist society. In 
actuality a chronically inefficient federal and 
republican political-economic structure, deeply 
embedded at every level of society, was driven by 
the internal politics of a Soviet-type namenklatura. 
Before and even more so following the death of 
Tito in 1980, political power redounded to elites 
within the political units that, however different in 
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size of population or economic growth~ were 
recognised, as co-equals at the federal level. In 
these and other bodies the 'national key' was used 
to ensure that unbalanced representation by any 
nation or nationality was avoided. Such 
arrangements therefore tacitly acknowledged the 
continuing relevance of nationalism as a political 
force. They accepted the actuality of a continuous 
struggle for power over economic resources 
between the republics, autonomous regions, and 
the federation. Indeed when advisory councils 
within enterprises, local government communes, 
and sub-regional levels are taken into account, all 
of which were empowered through the theory of 
socialist workers' self-management, it can be seen 
that the SFRY operated as a multi-national 
economic semi-democracy pretending to be a one-
party state. Thus it contained by incorporation the 
issues of nationalism in the contemporary world: 
Based on an ideology that proved utopian and 
on a power structure that was both undemo-
cratic and bound to be inefficient and to 
deteriorate, the communist solution of the 
national question in Yugoslavia was destined to 
be transient. (Djilas 1991:187) 
The party brought nominal unity to this diversity. 
But democratic central ism was an insufficient 
principle to keep order within an oligarchy of 
quarrelsome senior figures, many of whom by the 
mid-1980s were old men who had gained their 
places because of wartime service, and therefore 
moderated their disagreements in the spirit of 
Clausewitz rather than that of Lenin. Aspiring 
younger men in a hurry thought such moderation a 
bad thing. And a temperamental society remained 
full of different localisms and provincialisms, yet 
was also habituated to expectations of rising 
prosperity, induced both by contact with the west, 
and by Yugoslavia's own, unique, welfare 
economy. 
During the cold war, and before the world 
economy went into its repeated recessions in the 
1970s and 1980s, subsidies to the JNA and state 
budget coming from the US, and soft loans from 
international lending institutions, together with 
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remittances from Yugoslavs abroad (many of 
whom intended to return and therefore invested 
heavily in the private sector of the domestic 
economy) allowed this complex socio-economic 
structure to sustain itself. But when economic 
recessions and hyper-inflation added themselves to 
its inherent market inefficiency, the Yugoslav 
experiment faced a series of increasingly urgent 
questions. To these during the 1980s, as reform 
became more and more imperative, there was no 
sustained, coherent response. 
This exhaustion of ideas was seized upon by 
the ambitious contenders for power within the 
LCY. The habitual response of the federal authori-
ties, which had been to operate 'subsidiarity' as a 
compensation for their bankrupt vision of integra-
tion, was at last overtly challenged. As economic 
disagreements mounted, attempts were made to 
strengthen federal powers. This served to sharpen 
rather than resolve inter-republican disagreements, 
both over resource allocations and the best 'reform 
model' for the economy and constitution. Within 
society, inflation and unemployment refreshed 
ethnic tensions. Extreme nationalism was revived 
as a popular cause in different Yugoslav republics, 
but especially in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia. 
Whether it would have led to widespread civil war 
had federal economic reforms succeeded is 
therefore a crucial issue. 
The mounting internal dilemmas of the SFRY 
were compounded by the influence of various 
groups which had gone into exile after the Second 
World War, and remained unreconciled to the idea 
of Yugoslavia, or to communism, or both. These 
groups fiercely sustained their own ethnic, national 
or religious ideals. Based in prosperous western 
countries including the US, Canada, Australia, 
South Africa, Germany, Britain and elsewhere, the 
openness of Yugoslavia, and family and other ties 
to Yugoslavs in economic emigration or living 
within the SFRY, meant that the social structure of 
Yugoslavia's republics was penetrated by largely 
invisible influences possessing the money and other 
resources to seriously contend for power if the 
federal structures of the SFRY broke down. 
Another destabilising influence came from 
further north in central Europe. Other national-
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states were leaving the orbit of Soviet power; 
throwing off their communist governments; 
reshaping their historical identities. An early 
example of this 'socialist transnationalism' had 
been the quickly-suppressed Croatian uprising of 
1970-71, which took much of its inspiration from 
the Prague spring of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. By 
the mid-1980s the comprehensive failure of the 
Soviet-type society was pervading political thought 
even in Serbia, which remained most closely 
wedded to the survival of the SFRY. This removed 
the last great impediment to open nationalist 
agitation everywhere, and posed an almost insolu-
ble dilemma to Serbian, Croatian and other senior 
officers of the JNA. 
Background hyper-inflation, rising unemploy-
ment, failed growth; these features of Yugoslavia in 
the international economy during the 1980s 
brought different consequences to different sectors 
of the economy, regions of the territory, and 
groups in society. Social conflict based on previ-
ously established ethnic-religious categories and 
historical justifications, flourished. Different 
variants of the relationship between economic 
recession, political atrophy, and the rise of ethnic 
tensions can be defined. The basic recipe is, 
however, familiar from the history of totalitarian-
ism in Europe. Take one ethnically heterogeneous 
society. Apply hyper-inflation. Watch carefully 
while economic competitiveness induces social 
dislocation, and inter-communal stereotypes bubble 
up to the surface. Add several knobs of fanatical 
leadership, and some bunches of guns and money 
freshly brought in from outside. Leave to cook 
while new ideological movements coalesce, until 
the entire mixture boils over into inter-communal 
killing, ethnic cleansing, and international war. This 
basic dish can be modified to use all sorts of 
different national ingredients. 
In January !990 an Extraordinary Congress of 
the LCY, called to try to resolve the deadlock of 
ideas and institutions in the SFR Y through the 
party, collapsed. The Slovenian delegation walked 
out. Then the Croats, bullied to form a platform 
against the Slovenes, walked out, too. Serbia had 
revoked the autonomous constitutional positions of 
Vojvodina and Kosovo in 1989 (though this was 
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not finalised until a legislative referendum on a new 
constitution in July 1990); but had not withdrawn 
their representation from the federal presidency, 
which greatly alarmed other republics. (Cmobmja 
1994: I 05-6) But the public collapse ofthe LCY 
was only the culmination of many years' inward 
deterioration. (Goati 1995: 14-27) Indeed action 
quickly shifted to the holding of multi-party 
elections in various republics. In the name of 
democracy this brought into power nationalist 
regimes determined to oppose to the hilt Serbian 
socialism and centralism. Despite the continuing 
economic reform programme of the federal 
authorities, and their attempts to encourage federa-
tion-wide elections, an unbridged dichotomy 
thereafter grew between the ethnic, constitutional 
and economic preferences of most citizens for the 
continued existence of Yugoslavia; and the politics 
of the proto-national republics. A Slovenian refer-
endum in December 1990 first brought 'outright 
independence' onto the public political agenda, if 
no solutions were found to the federal economic 
and constitutional crises within six months. The 
Krajina Serbs, threatened by the destruction of 
their equal rights as citizens ofCroatia, simultane-
ously moved to establish their own autonomy or 
independence by forming a 'Serbian National 
Council' which declared 'autonomy within Croatia 
for areas of Serbian majority population'. The 
breakup of the SFRY had begun, and with that the 
national crisis entered a new stage as 'the battle of 
the republics'. 
But what then made national separatisms 
sufficiently potent to cause the disintegration of a 
sovereign state? In retrospect this outcome seems 
so predictable as to have been inevitable. 'National-
ist' explanations tend to suggest this. Yet it was 
unexpected, too. Like the French revolution it took 
most people by surprise when the SFR Y disinte-
grated altogether. This was what gave most of the 
leaders who preached nationalist separatisms their 
opportunities to act. It will be fascinating to know 
in due course how prepared, or otherwise, they 
were. Also like the French revolution, the descent 
into violence and ideological hatred came quite 
slowly. It seems to have come as a result of the 
absence of an overarching state, rather than as a 
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direct consequence of the collapse of the pre-
existing state. This cautions against any easy 
acceptance of the great and growing literature on 
why one nation or another could no longer live as 
part of Yugoslavia. 
Was the breakup of the SFFIY 
primarily caused by nationalism? 
My contention is that the breakup of the SFR Y 
was not primarily caused by nationalism, for two 
reasons. Firstly, other forces existed which had 
more easily observable political consequences and/ 
or more clear cut causal effects on the economic 
and social structure of the SFRY. Secondly, 
national separatisms were not new in Yugoslavia; 
indeed Yugoslavia was a union of separatists at 
different levels and forms of power and maturity in 
their national identities. 
Except during the Second World War, tenden-
cies for these identities to form their own states 
had been contained well short of destabilising the 
Yugoslav state. It is possible to contend, as do 
nationalist-minded historians of different stripes, 
that Yugoslavia was 'impossible' (Halll994) or 
'improbable' (Pavlowic 1981 ), and that its break-
down represented the 'inexorable' dissolution of 
the artificial union of 1918 (Magas 1993), or the 
'flawed legacy' ofTito's socialist experiment. 
(Beloff 1985) This, however, raises more difficult 
questions than it answers. Why does 'inexorability' 
take aver seventy years to arrive? Why were 
national separatisms in Croatia or in Serbia so 
quiescent for so much of the intervening period? 
What about national identities which were vigorous 
by 1988 but had barely existed in 1918, like that of 
the Slav-muslims in Bosnia? (Malcolm 1996) Or 
which, like the Albanians and Macedonians in 
Yugoslavia, had been unionist rather than separatist 
for much of the time? Is it reasonable to explain 
the previous unsuccessfulness of national 
separatisms by reference to Yugoslav or Titoist or 
communist repression, when by international 
comparisons, including numbers of the criteria 
employed to monitor minority rights, the political 
ethos of the SFR Y was suppressive but not unfree, 
rather than repressive? What about the facts which 
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demonstrate that even in its last phase, when 
nobody was anymore wanting to be a 'Yugoslav', 
large proportions of the individuals being subsumed 
under the new ethnic-national identities did not 
actively want their rights and duties as citizens of a 
federation to be redefined in such a fashion? (Table 
I 0) And, even more tellingly, what about the 
millions who even in the face of civil war refused 
to be evicted from the terrnirs in which they lived, 
even if these were inconveniently and dangerously 
located in propinquity to those of other ethnic? 
(Cohen 1993: 172-76) 
In the face of such questions, and recognising 
that we have not yet begun to tackle the harJ 
issues involving nationalism, I submit that a better 
explanation of the breakup of SFRY is to be found 
in the association between economic forces, 
federal structures, and republican political attitudes. 
Primarily, therefore, what differentiated the 
national crisis of 1989-91 from all preceding 
problems confronting the Yugoslav state was the 
compound effect of fiscal inefficiency (including 
hyper-inflation) and structural unemployment. The 
influence of these factors cannot be properly 
understood without reference to international 
conditions. Susan Woodward characterises the 
oddly normal behaviour of all the republican and 
federal leaders through most of this period in terms 
of 'politics as usual in unusual times'. (Woodward 
1995b:346) These leaders conducted themselves as 
if the well-established procedures ofYugoslavism 
would somehow suffice to manage the difficulties 
which accumulated from hyper-inflation, structural 
unemployment, the end of the cold war, and the 
absence of fresh assistance from the western 
governments and lending institutions that were 
creditors of the SFR Y. Indeed none of these 
difficulties was new in itself; what proved fatally 
unpredictable was their combination and interacting 
consequences. 
This misleading pervasiveness of normalcy can 
be exemplified as follows. In federal and inter-
republican bodies the language of political business 
remained that of economic and constitutional 
reform. Only in February 199 I did Slovenia-
rescinding its own previous declaration that six 
months would be allowed for resolving constitu-
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tional issues- declare that federal legislation would 
no longer have effect within the republic. The 
federal executive, grouped around Prime Minister 
Ante Markovic, mainly comprising federalist 
Croats, retained credibility with republican leader-
ships until it became clear, at about this time, that it 
had failed to negotiate any significant new eco-
nomic assistance from international institutions. It 
now had no further resources to deal with the 
domestic fiscal crisis, which many every republic 
and the federation bankrupt, except Slovenia and 
Croatia which were receiving credits directly from 
Austria, Germany and the US, but refusing to 
permit these to enter the nationwide system of 
inter-bank lending. At the same time the federation 
had failed to attract significant popular political 
support for its own, new, political movement, the 
·Alliance of Reform Forces', in the Serbian elec-
tions of December l 990. Although the CIA consid-
ered widespread civil violence in Croatia to be 
imminent from around this time, western govern-
ments offered no political mediation or fresh 
economic assistance until the middle of 1991. Even 
then it was contingent on conditions unacceptable 
to various parties. 
Following the Slovenian ultra vires act of 
national separation, covert bargaining among 
republican leaders assumed the form of an overt 
inter-republican crisis about how and on what 
terms the SFR Y might be either disintegrated, or 
kept in being as a nominal union of six republics. 
The Yugoslav crisis now entered a new stage 
( 1991-92), during which the proto-national-states, 
still in constitutional terms parts of the SFRY, 
might preserve some overarching political structure 
only by new techniques and a new language of 
crisis management. The Sybil and substance of this 
new crisis was a secret meeting between presi-
dents Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo 
Tudjman of Croatia at Karadjordjevo in March 
1991, during which they discussed the disintegra-
tion of the SFRY but failed to agree about either 
keeping it together or, more crucially, managing its 
demise without war. Hence recognition of the 
depths and implications of the new crisis was a 
development decidedly late in the day. Even so, 
none of the republican leaders seriously advocated 
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a plebescite of the people of Yugoslavia. Such 
behaviour suggests that the leadership elites of the 
SFR Y, even following the first democratically 
contested elections, thought in time-worn oligar-
chic terms, using a system of thought and accom-
panying rules that had not evolved in time to meet 
new challenges. 
The adjustments required were increasingly 
formidable. (Woodward 1995b:351-52,359) The 
SFR Y had sacrificed market-economic efficiency 
in favour of its own type of 'welfare' economy. 
The country was becoming more urbanised: the 
population living in rural conditions fell from nearly 
70per cent in the 1970s to some 20per cent in the 
late 1980s. Becoming also more integrated with the 
western international economy, it was exposed to 
the problem of hidden structural underemployment. 
From 1979 when emergency credits were neces-
sary to stave off technical bankruptcy, loans from 
the IMF and other lenders became more and more 
conditional upon drastic reforms. A chronic deficit 
in the balance of payments on external account 
was covered partly but not entirely by the remit-
tances of Yugoslavs working abroad. Emigration 
was an important mechanism in lessening domestic 
unemployment. A high estimate of the number of 
Yugoslavs living abroad made by the federal foreign 
ministry in 1990 was 'about 3 million'. In condi-
tions of economic recession and growing unem-
ployment in western Europe, and of mounting 
national separatisms within the SFRY, these 
remittances tended to dry up, or anyway to evade 
the usual channels by which they entered the 
domestic economy. At the same time the military 
faced the requirements of a rapidly changing 
strategic environment. The 1980s was a decade of 
fierce if unnecessary strategic competition between 
the superpowers, with sophisticated new weapons 
and technologies presenting complex defence 
problems to a country formally non-aligned with 
either bloc, and committed to defending itself 
against both. 
Once the economic recession and debt crisis of 
the world economy in the early 1980s added itself 
to these problems, Yugoslavia experienced hyper-
inflation, beginning in 1985, which was not driven 
out of the system until I 990 (and which returned 
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when civil war broke out in 1991-92). Traditional 
export markets in the Soviet bloc were becoming 
more difficult, as the loans which these countries 
had accumulated, without managing to improve 
their productivity, severely limited their import 
potentials, and in general growth slowed to a halt. 
To the west, on the other hand, the economic 
recession of the early 1980s meant increased 
competitiveness, which Yugoslavia's export trade 
was poorly adapted to, though the north-western 
regions and Vojvodina did better than others. 
Hence like the eastern European countries which 
were about to suffer the collapse of their commu-
nist regimes, Yugoslavia possessed an economy 
which was to all intents and purposes archaic; but 
unlike those countries, the SFRY did not experi-
ence a political revolution, and did not receive the 
special consideration of western governments and 
banks in a post-revolutionary process of 'transfor-
mation'. On top of all of this the collapse of the 
WTO, and hence of any pretence of an external 
threat, led to the immediate withdrawal of consid-
erable US bilateral assistance, and hence to further 
pressures in the inter-republic struggle for re-
sources for cuts in defence expenditures allocated 
to the JNA. (Woodward 1995b:363) 
A vitally important concomitant of this situation 
was that, 'by the (later) 1980s unemployment was 
threatening industrial workers and especially the 
children of the urban middle class. Unemployment 
now faced the chief beneficiaries of socialism -
industrial workers and budget-financed administra-
tors and professionals.' (Woodward 1995b:348) In 
the SFRY nearly 60 per cent of all non-agricultural 
workers worked in 'the public sector'. And by 
1987 the public sector - most specifically the 
federal-run banking system - was broke. 
(Woodward 1995b:352) 
The general effect of economic forces on real 
net personal incomes in Yugoslavia is shown in 
Table 17. From a base of 100 in 1955, the mean 
average per capita income rose to 320 in 1978. 
Thereafter it declined to a 1984-5 low of around 
240, rose again to around 260 in 1987, and fell 
back below 200 in the crisis years 1988-90. 
Judged in time-period relativities, the income of the 
average worker in the SFR Y was more than 20 per 
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cent less in 1987 than ten years earlier. By 1990 it 
was plunging back towards the level of the 1960s. 
As if this was not a severe enough jolt to rising 
expectations -though Yugoslavs in work abroad 
and some groups in the country were doing so 
much better than others - much worse was to 
come, and to come suddenly. In 1991 hyper-
inflation made its reappearance. All of the republics 
directly touched by war experienced this; but a 
new world record was achieved by conditions in 
Serbia during 1993-94, where monthly inflation at 
one point in time touched 313 million per cent., 
passing the levels previously reached in Weimar 
Germany and immediate postwar Hungary. (Silber 
& Little 1996:383) 
Even within the SFRY, the combined effects of 
rising prices, (accelerated by devaluations of the 
Dinar), eroding real incomes, and growing unem-
ployment, seems to have had a crippling effect on 
social tolerance, and to have induced rapid in-
creases in social distancing both from other ethnic 
groups within the same social space, and from 
other groups in other republics which were being 
depicted in increasingly overt terms of inter-
republican conflict as 'enemies'. Caught in the 
middle and attracting the image of impotence and 
failure, support for the federation quickly evapo-
rated. (Hall 1994:69-89) The socio-economic and 
political consequences of this national (federal) 
crisis, which struck well before any decisive 
polarisation of inter-republican or inter-ethnic 
conflicts, included the following: 
I. Loss of capacity on the part of all political 
and economic structures, at every level, to enforce 
policy goals. 
2. Declining legitimacy of social rules transmit-
ted and upheld via employment. This affected not 
only security of employment but also the elaborate 
inter-ethnic balances upheld by Yugoslavism in 
such sensitive regions as central and eastern 
Bosnia, the mixed Serb and Croat regions of 
Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. In order-uphold-
ing structures such as the police this soon pro-
duced an underlying source of social conflict 
which, as ethnic tensions grew, would make police 
forces in many parts of the SFRY creatures of 
national separatisms, and throw a correspondingly 
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greater burden of order-maintenance onto the 
regular Army, which was not well adapted to that 
role. 
3. Stasis in federal institutions and mounting 
conflicts between the central state and ALL of the 
republics. 
4. From a non-political or 'social' point of 
view, the absence of fresh and workable policy 
initiatives appeared inexcusable. 
5. The virtual collapse of the 'internal' econo-
mies of the weakest republics (Serbia, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Macedonia). The governments of 
these republics now needed constitutional reforms 
which would 'favourably' alter the federal-republi-
can balance of powers by strengthening the 
federation's economic instruments. 
6. A specific and deepening difference between 
the federation and the economically weakest 
republics on one side, and on the other Slovenia 
(joined gradually by Croatia) whose 'internal' 
economy experienced a qualitative shift forward 
due to the espousal of market-efficient economic 
reforms, especially after the collapse of the Soviet-
type states in central (eastern) Europe. Slovenia 
specifically refused to allow fresh credits and 
investments from Austrian, Gennan and other 
investors to turn into a 'guided' country-wide flow 
of capital, labour and foreign exchange. 
The main hypothesis to be derived from this 
analysis is that far from beginning in a 'nationalist' 
conflict over the future of the SFRY, its breakup 
begins with a national economic crisis, in terms of 
which the main issue was not that there was no 
consensus among political leaders, but rather that 
consensus was the only mechanism available for 
resolving hard choices about new problems. 
Specifically, all the political elites in the SFRY 
drew the same basic conclusion from the impact 
of the external economic and strategic environ-
ments, namely that Yugoslavia would need to 
change rapidly in a 'western' direction. 
(Woodward 1995b:346-361) Yet serious economic 
and political difficulties began to cumulate in two 
issue-areas. Firstly the strengthening of federal 
authority, which was implied by responses to the 
economic crisis, and advocated persistently both 
by Yugoslavia's creditors and by the federalists in 
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its national elites, was resisted for differing reasons 
by all of the republics which had gained power at 
the expense of the centre over a long period. 
Secondly, defining a new inter-republican balance 
of influence in a restructured federation or confed-
eration, wherein the economic growth paths of the 
strongest 'northern' areas (Slovenia, Zagoria, 
Slavonija, Vojvodina, the Dalmatian coastal strip) 
would be less threatened by the 'drag' exerted by 
the 'southern' regions beset by structural unem-
ployment and out-of-date industries (central Serbia, 
Kosovo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and the 
hinterland ofMontenegro), became hopelessly 
entrammeled with the requirements of democrati-
sation, and with the rhetoric of 'free-marketeers' 
(Croatia and Slovenia) versus 'unreformed social-
ists' (Serbia and Montenegro). 
In 1989-90 outside interference in this conten-
tious process became serious: the US Congress 
offered credits directly to 'free-market' republics. 
Austrian and German banks and industrial interests 
invested directly in Slovenia's and Croatia's 
financial sectors. The US Congress moved to 
amend the Direct Aid to Democracies Act by 
dissociating the human rights' problems of minori-
ties in Slovenia and Croatia from those of the 
Albanians in Kosovo. (Woodward 1995a: 160-61) 
This shifted the post-cold war balance of eco-
nomic forces within the SFRY decidedly in favour 
of the reform model favoured by Slovenia against 
Serbia. Added encouragement was lent to republi-
can attitudes and interests against the centralising 
logic of the federal government and external 
(international) creditors. In these terms, with 
respect to the second stage of the national crisis, 
there is substance in Woodward's contention that: 
The process of break up was begun by politi-
cians in wealthier regions located nearer to 
western markets, with close communications 
and cultural/inks to western and central 
Europe, and with less dependence on the 
internal economy and greater integration into 
foreign trade, investment and capital .flows. 
These were also areas with influential western 
patrons who promised support. (Woodward 
1995a:349) 
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Why did federalism prove ultimately 
unavailing? 
Once again this question has received easy an-
swers from those who contend that the breakup of 
Yugoslavia was fore-ordained. it is pointed out that 
the republics, or at least some of them, existed as 
proto-national-states, each with its own bounda-
ries, governments, security and territorial defence 
structures, economic infrastructures and republi-
can elites and masses. Alternatively, the inherently 
mixed ethnic pattern of most territories within the 
federation, and the 'contested' nature of the 
boundaries established between the republics under 
Tito, it is said, comprised a time-bomb waiting to 
go off; or anyway a long-lasting corrosive which 
would sooner or later wear down the structure of 
the 'national' state. It seems to me that a much 
less obvious answer is required if we are to 
understand properly what broke Yugoslavia apart in 
the manner that it did. 
To begin with, the anti-inflationary economic 
reform programme embarked on by the govern-
ment of prime minister Ante Markovic, which had 
been installed in early 1989, worked. The Dinar 
was 'tied' to the Deutschmark. Private savings 
were made freely convertible. Wage increases 
were strictly controlled. New banking and foreign 
trade liberalisation programmes were announced. 
State-controlled assets were to be privatised. 
Government expenditures were to be systemati-
cally reduced. The most obvious result of these 
steps was a fall in the inflation rate from 60per 
cent per month at the end of 1989, to virtually zero 
in mid-1990. (Cohen 1993:66-73; Crnobrnja 
1994: 148) 
But while these measures brought it consider-
able popularity, the federal government lacked an 
independent political basis on which to contend 
with the republics. Following the first democratic 
elections in the Yugoslav republics in 1990, the 
parliament of the federation, which in normal 
conditions would be 'normally the supreme expres-
sion of a democracy' was reduced instead to a 
charivari. Its upper (elected) chamber would 
remain the province of unrepresentative communist 
nominees of the now defunct LCY until such time 
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as federal elections were held. But meanwhile its 
lower chamber, consisting of representatives of 
parties elected in republican elections, altered its 
composition whenever a new election was held in 
one or another of the republics. This confused the 
issue of legislative authority, and obstructed what 
efforts were made to form trans-republican 
political coalitions. But the republican governments 
locked in conflict about the reform of the constitu-
tion and the terms of ;2CGi10i11j~ !:!luLiii!ldLiuu .,_:..,~;~:._~ 
not come to an agreement about holding early 
federal elections. Serbia sponsored the argument 
that an early election should be held across Yugo-
slavia, based on universal adult suffrage. This 
would probably have resulted in a 'Serb bloc' or 
coalition, though given the subsequent course of 
intra-Serbian dissention it would be quite wrong to 
believe that would necessarily have led to the 
triumph of Serb chauvinism. Slovenia and Croatia, 
advertised internationally as champions of freedom 
of expression, opposed the idea of an elected 
federal parliament, proposing that, after agreement 
on the modalities of constitutional reform, there 
should be a single chamber federal assembly 
consisting of appointed (unelected) representatives. 
(Cohen 1993:59-61, 102-7; Cmobrnja 1994:112-
14, 146-48) 
Out of mounting frustration, but also on the 
back of the initial success of his counter-inflation 
programme, Markovic chose to form a federal 
political party. However, as elections had already 
been held in some republics, and these republics 
refused to hold fresh elections to accommodate his 
proposals, this new entity could function only in 
republics where elections were yet to be held. It 
did reasonably well in Bosnia-Hercegovina (about 
14 per cent support) but badly in Serbia (under 2 
per cent); and that killed not only the form of the 
party but also the remaining political credibility of 
the prime minister, who had opened himself to 
charges of exceeding his appropriate powers. 
(Cohen 1993:146-7) 
But it was not democracy or its frustration per 
se that de-legitimised the federation. Rather, it 
failed to accumulate enough power to counter the 
separate paths each of the republics had begun to 
pursue in response to the economic crisis and the 
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need for constitutional reform. Given the nature of 
that crisis there was only one avenue by which the 
federation could have accumulated the necessary 
power to maintain a more than temporary re-
imposition of authority over the banking, monetary 
and tax systems operating within the republics: 
sufficient economic assistance from the west. As 
with Gorbachev's vain efforts to save the USSR a 
year later, in 1990 the Yugoslav federalists pleaded 
and begged for the fresh money that, following the 
initial success of Markovic's anti-inflation strategy, 
might have consolidated stability on a national 
basis. (Crnobrnja 1994:149-50) 
it must remain a matter of speculation how far 
such macro-economic consolidation would have 
modified the constitutional conflict among the 
republics. But as in mid-1990 none of the republics 
had as yet proposed the demise of the federation 
we are entitled to hypothesise that macro-eco-
nomic consolidation through federation-driven 
continuing reform might have kept in being a loose 
confederation of Yugoslav national-republics. That 
in turn might have obviated civil war. In the 
absence of such consolidation, the national eco-
nomic system collapsed into the hands of the 
anyway conflicting republics: 
In autumn !990 the republics[ .. .] openly and 
blatantly abandoned the agreed-upon course of 
reform. Government expenditures rose in all 
republics, the process of privatisation was 
stopped, cancelled or delayed, with social 
proper~v being nationalised equally vigorously 
in the socialist Serbia and the western-oriented 
and proto-capitalist Slovenia and Croatia. 
Incomes, which were also supposed to be 
controlled, grew exponentially, thus wrecking 
the second of the three anchors that held the 
anti-inflationary boat. Foreign reserves were 
depleted rapidly, forcing the government to 
carry out two consecutive devaluations, abol-
ishing thereby the third and last anchor (price 
stabilit;1. The reform program was all but 
finished. (Crnobmja 1994: l 54, emphasis in 
original) 
In concentrating attention on the national crisis and 
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what was different about the demands it placed on 
the political and social structure of the SFRY, we 
must ignore the significance of long-run and 
predisposing factors. Of these the most important 
surely was that Yugoslavism and the Yugoslav 
national identity were always closely correlated 
with Yugoslav socialism, which was never en-
dorsed in freely-contested (multi-party) elections 
by the majority of any nation or nationality before 
the Serbian elections of December I 990. Although 
they had achieved strong support amounting to 35-
40 per cent of the voters in parliamentary elections 
in Croatia and Slovenia (Margaret Thatcher in her 
enormous election victories in Britain in 1983 and 
1987 won 40-42 per cent of votes cast), it was 
made to seem that the peoples of Slovenia and 
Croatia had decisively rejected continuing rule by 
their unreforrned republican communist organisa-
tions. But actually they had not rejected reform-
communists. Nor had they by any means afforded 
blanket endorsement to extreme nationalist pro-
grammes. 
The central difficulty was that by now federal 
structures were so weak that an alternative identity to 
the dominant political party within republics was hard 
to define, and this difficulty also confronted opposi-
tion parties. Indeed a Yugoslav identity tended to be 
an avocation, something additional to a basic reli-
gious, national, ethnic or local identity. This is not to 
say that the small minority of those who thought of 
themselves as primarily Yugoslavs were isolated by 
other nationalisms, or failed to gain the assent of 
others who preferred more traditional affiliations. But 
it is to say that just as Yugoslavia was in effect an 
oligarchy masquerading as a democracy, so it was 
also a political movement and a specific ideo!O),')' that 
claimed to constitute a nationality of all nationalities. 
When that claim became manifestly absurd, as it 
seemed to have done by 1991, all remaining support 
for federalism as 'Yugoslavism' went with it. (Table 
9) 
The failure of this ideology can be mapped 
graphically by looking at youth participation in the 
LCY, and at youth attitudes towards membership of 
the party. This shows that from an active base of 
around 30 per cent and possibly rising in the late 
1970s, with little variation between different regions 
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and republics, participation fell to below 16 per cent 
in the first half of 1989, and had eroded far further 
in Slovenia and Croatia. Correspondingly, whereas 
large minorities of youth in these republics pre-
ferred not to join the LCY in the mid-1970s, the 
average of those preferring not to do so across the 
SFRY was under I 0 per cent; but by 1989 the 
average across the country was over 50 per cent 
and in the two northern republics had risen to over 
90 per cent and 75 per cent respectively. (Cohen 
1993:48; Tables 12a-b) 
As we have seen, at the core of Yugoslavia's 
'federalism in society' was a welfare-economic 
system distributing benefits through employment 
and in turn eo-opting large sections of the urban 
and rural proletariat, and the middle class members 
of the administrative, professional and business 
elites. The disintegration of this social contract and 
its accompanying 'operational code' for employ-
ment rules and ethnic quotas in the disciplined and 
public services, and in state-run sectors of the 
professions and commerce, was bound to weaken 
support for the federation. Indeed it did so by 
posing dilemmas of choice for those broadly 
adhering to the idea of Yugoslavia, between their 
political outlook and their economic livelihood; and 
between the notion of a central, overarching state, 
and the competing claims to self-sufficiency and 
sovereignty of the proto-national-states which 
dominated increasingly the political agenda of inter-
republican affairs. 
In micro-economic terms, those of the family 
or individual, the federation's economic strategy 
was threatening to increase unemployment and 
prices, decrease wages, and introduce other 
market-efficient reforms that jeopardised traditional 
economic security and welfare, and was unable to 
guarantee that the sacrifices entailed were leading 
to a more stable future, then why not choose a 
different but apparently easily available alternative 
identity that promised to obviate these forms of 
insecurity, or at least to make the necessary 
accompanying sacrifices mean something more 
than adherence to a contested country? At that 
micro-political level the kind of question which 
those economic choices would result in concerned 
whether voting for a federation that has failed 
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economically but that it was desired should be kept 
in being in terms of multi-ethnic life, would amount 
to a vote for the status quo when what clearly was 
demanded was a vote for change. 
Survey data covering the period 1971-1985 
indicates there was a fivefold increase in those 
identifYing themselves as Yugoslavs. This trend 
was continuing, 'concentrated among younger and 
more educated citizens and those residing in urban 
localities and certain geographic regions [ ... ] 
multinational areas such as Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
Vojvodina and Croatia [ ... ]'.The inference to be 
drawn from this evidence, taken together with 
earlier statistics on the rapid decline of party 
affiliation in the later 1980s, is that: 
Such Yugoslavism indicated a reservoir of 
support for the country's cohesion at approxi-
mately the same time that ethnic tensions and 
economic problems throughout Yugoslavia were 
becoming more serious. [ . .} Exactly where 
these divergent, but nolnecessari(v contradic-
tory, dimensions of the Yugoslav political 
landscape would eventually lead depended in 
large part on the counlly 's divided post-Tito 
ruling elite. (Cohen 1993:49) 
This point in the argument is slightly complex but 
basically straightforward and open to further 
testing. It is that tax revolts and other measures of 
protest by individuals, enterprises and republican 
legislatures against the federation during the period 
1989-91 decisively lost support for its political and 
constitutional reform, and confirmed the futility of 
its economic reform programme after that had 
failed. But in economic terms it had initially been 
winning, and had it continued to do so it is reason-
able to think that it would have received public 
endorsement. Hence it is mistaken to contend that 
these revolts were primarily driven by nationalist 
separatist motives or objectives. 
The paradox of Serbian nationalism illustrates 
the point: the Serbian government broke federal 
constitutional provisions on the use of federal 
funds during 1990 in order to pay public service 
employees of the state, including the federation, 
even while Serbia was insisting in the inter-republi-
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can struggle with Slovenia that the most appropri-
ate reform model for the federal constitution and 
political structure of the SFRY was a 'centralising' 
one. At the same time, neither Slovenia prior to the 
election of a coalition government in early 1990, 
nor Croatia, still ruled by its communist party, 
were advocating the demise of the federation, as 
distinct from its reform into a loose confederation 
affording economic sovereignty to its constituent 
republics. 
The evidence suggests that, following the 
elections of 1990, republics, enterprises, legisla-
tures and citizens, moved to break federal rules 
because the federation was failing to perform 
according to its declared objectives, not because 
they wanted the federation to fail by breaking its 
constitutional provisions. But now a fundamentally 
important structural difference appeared in the 
situation of different republics. Having external 
support for their ongoing economic needs and 
evolving separatist aims, Slovenia and Croatia 
could afford to wait - as Clausewitz would have 
put it - on the strategic defensive but with the 
offensive aim in view. Serbia and the poorer 
republics, desperate for resources with which to 
continue to meet their heavy welfare liabilities, 
needed increasingly to force the issues of the 
future of the nation and its federation so as to 
sustain their own intra-republican requirements. In 
general terms, the 'culminating point' for holding 
the nation together through a federation which was 
operating an authoritative reform strategy vis a vis 
the republics occurred, without action being taken, 
in the fall of 1990. 
All other comparisons and similarities aside, this 
decisively distinguishes the Yugoslav experience of 
resurgent nationalism from rl1e 'typical' east 
European model. Hence it is in this specific socio-
economic context that the identity-preferences of 
the elites and masses during the ensuing period 
1991-92, the collapse into civil war, ought to be 
interpreted. 
Why did the league of Communists of 
Yugoslavia lose its legitimacy? 
It follows from the foregoing that I do not con-
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sider the LCY was particularly important to the 
course of subsequent events, or the role of national 
separatisms. But as we shall see in due course, the 
issue is important for explaining why the JNA 
failed to uphold the cause of the federation. 
There are those who contend that the LCY 
never possessed legitimacy because it monopolised 
power by violence or coercion. Others, like 
Milovan Djilas, one ofTito's closest wartime 
colleagues, denounced the party's intellectual and 
material corruptedness: the 'new class' governed 
in the name of socialism, but did not believe its 
own teleology. Abroad, and sometimes at home, 
revolt against this godless mythology led anti-
communist Croats, Serbs and others into acts of 
rebellion. Numerous assassinations and other acts 
of outrage were perpetrated against Yugoslav state 
officials, or symbols and assets of the state, by 
quite highly organised groups opposing the regime 
and awaiting their days of vengeance. But, ac-
knowledging that, it seems to me that, as a socio-
logical concept, legitimacy telis us a great deal 
about the disintegration of the SFR Y. 
The party ran Yugoslavia much less by selective 
repressioa than by incorporation, including persist-
ent educational and cultural self-advertisement. Its 
extensive nomenklatura reached down into all of 
the 520 or so local government structures (com-
munes). As economic and cultural decision-making 
shifted from the central government to republics 
and enterprises, these party-dominated elites 
became effectively tri-identical, owing something 
to place of work, republic, and federation. Thus 
the party assumed many forms. While the SFRY 
held together they could be reconciled. Once it 
began to break up, they could not. 
The building of Yugoslav national identity, at the 
stage of incorporation into elites postulated a belief 
in communism. The strength of this as a factor in 
party membership, or office thereafter, varied from 
commune to commune, within regions, in different 
enterprises or professions, and indeed from time to 
time and circumstance. For example it is frequently 
noted that after the 'Croatian spring' in I 971, party 
leaders and new members were selected with 
particular care for their ideological conformism. 
But everywhere, selecting to join the party meant a 
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choice of principles that many refused, or were 
later to recant. 
At the same time the party-republic-federation-
national identity linkage was inherently 'soft'. In 
Yugoslavia communism was imposed from within, 
unlike the other states in eastern Europe; and it had 
to function to manage and if possible transcend 
ethnic-national differences more complex and 
embittered by war than anywhere else in Europe. 
Moreover, as the prevailing ideology disbelieved in 
nationalism as an enduring difficulty, still less as an 
autonomous loyalty structure in a socialist society, 
the party's task was to build an inclusive state-
society rather than acting as a vanguard party or 
preserving the purity of pre-existing doctrine. 
Hence the party as a structure demanding affective 
loyalty, and imposing a stringent identity, came 
well behind two or three others: a pre-existing 
·ethnic' identity; an active belief in a socialist 
society; and a commitment to building an integra-
tive federation through Yugoslavism. 
There were three main avenues for an indi-
vidual, whether or not incorporated into elites, to 
find a role in public service: the bureaucracy; the 
armed forces; or state-run commerce and industry, 
including foreign trade. There is much evidence to 
suggest that through time the third of these av-
enues became the most sought after. The bureauc-
racy was too close to politics, and too closely 
scrutinised. The armed forces demanded greater 
ideological commitment, particularly for promo-
tion. Trade, industry and foreign relations were in a 
sense less crucial to party orthodoxy, and more 
demanding of talents that the country needed. So 
even though party membership was a pre-condition 
of access or advancement, in a commercial or 
'abroad' career in the west it demanded little in 
practice that a man or woman of flexible outlook 
could not accept. 
Given the scope of public enterprise and 
employment in the SFRY, a career in one of the 
professions involving, quite possibly, work and 
residence abroad, fostered talents that were, in 
turn, relied upon later at the higher levels of party 
leadership in the republics or by the federation. 
Unlike the Soviet Union or most of the east Euro-
pean states, therefore, Yugoslavia's greater interde-
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pendence with the western world combined with 
the 'soft' ideological goals of the party's domestic 
programmes to produce aspiring leaders in the 
1970s, and more particularly the 1980s, who saw 
little contradiction between their commitments to 
Yugoslavism and to other 'national' identities, or 
between those to socialism and to western eco-
nomic and social values. 
The role of the party in undermining the legiti-
macy of the party in the SFRY is unique among the 
histories of the downfall of communist states. In 
several republics, most notably Serbia, Slovenia 
and Croatia, inter-republican party quarrels were 
overt, relying on the influence of media 'informa-
tion' wars, even before the series of elections 
during 1990 which brought non-communist parties 
onto the political scene for the first time. Simulta-
neously, communist or reform-communist leaders 
were bidding to reshape their identities by appealing 
to national traditions, sentiments and interests. The 
paradox is that the overt inner contradiction, which 
made the LCY as an institution peripheral rather 
than central to the growing struggle of personalities 
in the politics of the disintegrating SFRY, and 
which at the same time encouraged these recent 
former-comrades to brawl with each other publicly 
as they done privately, ought also to have made the 
reform of the state Yugoslavia less difficult than 
that of other eastern European states. That the 
opposite would prove to be the case must therefore 
take our enquiry beyond the role of the party as 
such, into the role of leading figures from the LCY. 
In Serbia Slobodan Milosevic established an 
uncontested position by upholding Serbian rights 
and suppressing those of the autonomous regions. 
Later, for a period, he needed the support of the 
more extreme nationalist Radical Party, primarily in 
order to defeat the democratic opposition and the 
challenge from Milan Panic as federal prime 
minister during 1992. But from his position as 
president of the Serbian LCY, Milosevic was to 
dominate the politics of Serbia-Montenegro. There 
can be little doubt that despite the strength of 
opposition to him in Serbia, the Serbs' sense of 
being a beleaguered nation has made his position 
virtually unassailable by democratic methods, and 
that in due course he will succeed in gaining public 
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support to become president for life of the FRY. 
Serbia and Montenegro meanwhile have been 
transformed from proto-national-states within the 
SFRY to a single sovereign state sub-divided into 
two autonomous regions, based on the interests of 
a predominating nation; though the FRY remains a 
multi-ethnic society. 
The Slovenian case shows strong similarities, 
for all the differences that actually divided it from 
the Serbian case. The two republics vied with each 
other for the ascendant role in reshaping the SFRY. 
Despite its demographic weakness, Slovenia was 
much stronger economically than any other 
republic. It was also more mono-ethnic. Based on 
these strengths Milan Kucan, president of the 
Slovenian LCY, successfully appealed to a unified 
national sentiment to remain in power as president 
of the republic and gain for his reform communist 
party the largest single bloc of seats in free parlia-
mentary elections held in 1990. But the opposition 
bloc entered a power-sharing executive and took 
control of numerous powerful ministries. As in 
Serbia, where the opposition never gain executive 
control, non-communist political forces proved to 
be more radical in their nationalism than those 
whom they had displaced, or with whom they now 
shared power. It is arguable that under Kucan's 
overall leadership, it was the Christian Democrats 
and other strongly national separatist forces which 
pulled Slovenia onto a course of outright independ-
ence from the SFRY. This has not benefitted the 
economy or society to the extent promised by the 
uncompromising nationalists. And it most certainly 
contributed to the violent civil war in Croatia that 
ensued from the disintegration of the SFRY. 
Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, having once be-
longed to the LCY, abjured his former loyalties 
and, as leader of the highly nationalistic HDZ, 
successfully opposed the Croatian LCY in free 
elections in 1990 and drove it into opposition. That 
he succeeded so markedly owed much to the 
support of emigre Croatian organisations, and to 
the intense propaganda which control over the only 
nationwide television transmitting station in Zagreb 
afforded. But just as the Croatian LCY had been 
more 'orthodox' than others prior to the breakup 
of the LCY, so it took a less radical nationalist 
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stance in the democratic elections, and this may 
have cost it the opportunity to remain in a power-
sharing government. The consequences of that not 
having occurred were, arguably, profound. 
In Macedonia and Montenegro the former-
communist president of the Macedonian LCY, Kiro 
Gligorov, and the communist president of the 
Montenegrin LCY, Momir Bulatovic, stayed in 
power with widespread national support despite the 
existence of strong ethnic cleavages in both 
societies. In the Macedonian case the logic within 
society appears to have been that 'if we don't hang 
together, we shall hang separately': Macedonia's 
national identity remains disputable, and hence also 
potentially threatening, to Greece and Albania, and 
of some vital interest to Serbia and perhaps also 
Bulgaria. Hence despite the growing unpopularity 
of socialism-without-Yugoslavia, president and 
people found themselves sharing a situation; and 
Gligorov's power, experience and pragmatism 
were sufficient for him to stay in power with a 
significant US military presence securing the 
territorial limits of the fragile new 'national' state. 
In the Montenegrin case it was Serbia rather than 
the US that provided the indispensable guarantees 
to secure the national society against the irruptive 
tendencies of social conflict over competing 
national identities, and this factor has brought 
Montenegro into a probably irreversible integration 
with Serbia in the FRY. 
Only in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in the former 
autonomous region of Yojvodina (where popular 
opinion and leadership policies remained strongly 
pro-federation until late in the day) could it be said 
that the LCY was in a weak position from the 
outset. Even in these cases there were figures from 
the communist past- Goran Hadzic, Radovan 
Karadzic, Fikret Abdic - who continued to com-
mand widespread support within their ethnic 
communities. 
The loss of the federation's capacity to enforce 
its policy goals was, in part, a function of the 
breakdown of LCY discipline. This was not the 
main cause of its failure. And while the influence 
of events elsewhere in eastern Europe may have 
encouraged republican leaders in different parts of 
Yugoslavia to change their long-term strategies, 
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their conflicting interests were clearly pre-estab-
lished. What appears most directly to have caused 
the loss of legitimacy was the breakdown of 
democratic centralism, which by then was strictly 
a function of inter-personal conflicts between 
republican leaders. This loss of self-legitimation 
appears to have led immediately and overwhelm-
ingly to the discrediting of the party in the eyes of 
much of its membership. 
In parallel, the federation had to implement its 
policies through the deliberative councils which 
were a ubiquitous part of Yugoslav socialism. 
These councils traditionally took a strong cue from 
local party cadres. But once the LCY split, and 
there were corresponding splits at all levels, within 
as well as between republics, the party's capacity 
for influence in the deliberative councils collapsed, 
leaving them open to many new influences. This 
was tantamount to the failure of social legitimacy. 
Probably the breakdown of the orderly func-
tioning of the deliberative councils was more 
damaging to the aims of federal economic strategy 
than the collapse of the federal LCY. The former 
were irreplaceable, not least because the habits of 
mind of millions of workers, developed over many 
years, could not simply be scrapped. During a 
transitional period from authoritarian to democratic 
federalism these councils might have continued to 
work effectively, independent of the party. Cer-
tainly they were more representative of society in 
the SFRY than the party had been. Hence the 
collapse of the party did not necessarily mean the 
end of an effective economic reform strategy, 
because that depended far less on party authority 
than on whether or not there would be political 
agreement among the leaderships of the republics. 
At a micro-economic and micro-political level 
the collapse of party self-legitimacy and its causal 
relationship to social legitimacy help to explain why 
the LCY became anathematised in society so 
quickly. There are, perhaps, two main components 
to this explanation. Firstly, many of the most 
talented members of elites were ahead of the game. 
Their example and influence were considerable 
even if time-lagged for less talented or ambitious 
party members. Secondly, the erosion of party 
internal discipline meant the breakdown of the 
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(theoretical) fairness by which jobs and resources 
had previously been accessed. But as the party 
remained a repository of technical knowledge and 
habitual influence, even as its legitimacy was 
dissipating, this transformed it into 'a gatekeeper' 
for favouritism and advancement in such areas as 
higher education and employment in the bureauc-
racy. Hence by continuing to exercise micro-
economic and micro-political influence when its 
macro-political and macro-economic authority had 
gone the party destroyed any social legitimacy that 
might have remained to it. (Woodward 1995b:353) 
What this crude sociological model suggests is 
that the failure of the LCY to command effective 
authority was partly due to the failure of the 
federation to solve specific, and very deep-rooted, 
economic and political problems. At the end of the 
day this explains the defection of society from the 
party and, more importantly, from the Yugoslav 
model of welfare socialism. The party had been a 
structure for incorporating elites and masses, 
whether directly by party membership or indirectly 
through the deliberative councils, and specifically 
for transcending nationalism through elite and mass 
participation in the operation of socio-economic 
welfare. Once consensus formation failed, this 
posed a fundamental choice, between drastically 
revising social structures, necessitating democrati-
sation, and therefore redistributing power in 
unpredictable ways; and the abnegation of the 
federal structures of the SFRY through the politi-
cally motivated enhancement of pre-existing 
national identities. 
The latter course was followed. It tended 
strongly to conserve power in the hands of existing 
elites, whose most talented, ambitious and forceful 
members had anyway shifted their allegiances 
away from federal structures to those of the proto-
national-republics. But it would also open the door 
to the more extreme nationalistic aspirations of 
individuals and groups now operating freely inside 
Yugoslavia but outside the LCY; or returning from 
abroad with radical ideas of 'past revivals' or 
'future renaissances', and with plenty of money to 
try to put these into practice. This Pandora's box 
was opened partly by the pressures making for 
free democratic elections, following the example of 
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the rest of eastern Europe; but even more so by the 
personalised politics of republican and sub-republi-
can leaders, who in so many cases had shared a 
comradely past in the now-defunct LCY. 
The political revolutions which accompanied 
the failure of the SFRY to uphold its powers and 
competences, and which therefore dissolved the 
legitimacy of the party in society, produced a 
mounting confrontation between and within 
republics, dominated through the period of sup-
posed democratic transfonnation in I 990 by 
mounting rhetorical nationalisms, out of which the 
prevailing elites who anyway wielded power in 
Yugoslavia emerged still in place, in some cases 
now sharing power with, or manipulating, extreme 
nationalists from abroad or from within Yugosla-
via's most ethnically mixed or backward regions. 
As one acute observer has put it, the national crisis 
which had been largely economic in causation 
became an political struggle for power and territory 
in which these elites 'consciously preferred a 
revolutionary subordination of demos to ethnos'. 
(Janjic 1995) 
As a careful analysis of elite political conflicts in 
the SFRY concludes: 
[ . .} the outbreak of civil war in the "second 
llLgoslavia" did no/ result ji-om the a priori 
verdict of histm)•, but ji-om the actions of the 
republican elites which were deciding which 
one of the following courses { . .} events would 
take: democratic integration of the coumry, 
peaceji1l separation of the republics{ . .] or the 
war option. The first two scenarios required the 
conflicting political e/iles to achieve at least 
minimum agreement. Since this agreement was 
never reached, the conflict among the elites 
grew into a civil war. (Goati I 995:29) 
Why did the JNA fail to control the 
growth of civil violence? 
This is not a question that can be fully dealt with 
here. But it is too important to ignore entirely. The 
essence of an answer has been hinted at earlier: the 
JNA was so intimately identified with the federa-
tion and the party that if these collapsed the 
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question, 'To whom does the JNA belong?' would 
automatically arise. 
An army in search of a country is liable to be 
very dangerous to others, or very dangerous to 
itself. In either instance, it Jacks clear political 
guidance, which is indispensable to the measured 
use of force. Lacking the judgement to know 
where, when and how far to act, the JNA acted 
incoherently. The outcomes of its actions were 
everywhere subjected to wider political forces, 
none of which it was able to control. In many 
instances, particularly in Croatia during 199 I, it 
was middle-level commanders who acted most 
decisively. But as the crisis of the SFRY turned 
into the confrontation of the republics, mixed with 
Serb-Croat confrontation in the republic of Croatia, 
the main feature of JNA activity was its pusillani-
mous and inconsistent responses to the appearance 
of organised violence. This betokened its inner 
inaction and indecision, until it was taken over and 
subjected to Serbia's will. In turn, that inaction 
was the manifestation of its internal disintegration. 
Within the SFR Y the JNA was an incorporated 
part of the federal-party-welfare economy. Its 
political direction came from the prime minister 
and federal executive council. Its party-state 
representation made the defence minister its chief 
spokesman. Its welfare-economic role included a 
monopoly of expertise on strategic-technical 
knowledge, and the budgetary implications thereof. 
The 'ethnic key' was a vital part of its top manage-
ment, the General Staff. The party had its own 
institutional structure within the military, and the 
ethos of Yugoslavism was treated seriously by all 
ranks in its professional cadres. It was a vel)' large 
and expensive instrument, supposedly controlling 
the vast arsenals of weapons and defence produc-
tion which were features of Yugoslavia's strategic 
position between West and East in the cold war. it 
also had responsibility for securing the countl)' in 
the face of internal rebel! ion, and was therefore 
distinctly separated from, though it could also act 
to control in war, the TD forces belonging to each 
republic. 
Stasis in the federal (rotating) presidency meant 
that the defence minister had no clear interlocutor. 
The prime minister's executive was overwhelmed 
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during, and by, the economic crisis. The national 
budgetary crisis, and termination of US bilateral 
assistance induced a funding crisis, while simulta-
neously the revolutions in eastern Europe and the 
collapse ofthe USSR challenged its raison d'etre. 
Controlling the streets, separating ethnic 
communities when violence first began threatening 
in 1990 and early 1991, suppressing illegal acts by 
increasingly politicised militias and police, and 
securing the a.1senals of weapons inside Yugoslavia, 
were well within its capabilities, and were on the 
whole well executed, for at least a year after the 
demise of the LCY. There was, however, strong 
US and German pressure exercised by Ambassador 
Warren Zimmerman in January 1991, against 
disarming the extra-constitutional militias ofCroatia 
and Slovenia. (Cohen 1993:189-90) And in March 
1991 student protests in Belgrade led to a crisis in 
which, it would seem, president Milosevic sought 
to use the JNA; but, because his motives were 
doubted, the federal presidency was deadlocked, 
and neither the specifics of the situation nor the 
precedent it might set could command a clear 
consensus within the High Command, the military 
declined the proposition that they act. (Cohen 
1993:20 1-5) In Bosnia-Hercegovina the JNA 
contributed nobly to the minimisation of inter-
ethnic violence well into 1992. 
Thus the effective collapse of the federation in 
1991 was like the setting off of an internal time-
bomb within the JNA itself, because the issues of 
national separatisms could not now be avoided 
among brother officers and men; and because the 
constitutional frame of reference within which the 
JNA could justifYing acting to itself was breaking 
down. Hence the military-technical problems of 
acting on time - for instance to stop the arguably 
illegal Slovenian and Croatian UDls - compounded 
and were compounded by intense internal turmoil 
and debate in every garrison across Yugoslavia. 
These debates turned into paradox. The nature 
of that paradox was that only when it became clear 
beyond doubt that the federation no longer pos-
sessed a core identity capable of giving legal 
political direction to the armed forces would it be 
rational and legal to act in its absence. At that point 
in time it would be too late to act without backing 
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one or more of the proto-national-republics against 
others; but as the ethos of the JNA could not 
\\'arrant extra-constitutional military action in 
defence of the federation, it would clearly be 
unconstitutional to back one republic against 
another. 
The precise nature of this paradox was shown 
when JNA intervention took place following the 
Slovenian UDI at the end of June 1991. For some 
weeks previously the Serb president of the federa-
tion, whose time in office had expired, blocked the 
succession of the vice-president, Stipe Mesic, a 
nationalist Croat who had told the Croatianlegisla-
ture that his job was to end the SFRY. This was 
the kind of constitutional vacuum that the JNA was 
charged with obviating; but could not do so in the 
absence of a clear constitutional mandate for using 
force. 
Who were the warring parties and 
what did they achieve? 
With the disintegration of the SFRY so many 
warring parties emerged in \vhat was ceasing to be 
Yugoslavia that the world might be forgiven for 
seeking to find only two; one 'good' and the other 
'bad'. The international community, and particu-
larly the countries of the EC, followed by the US, 
chose to support 'good' Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and to calumnise 'bad' 
Serbia-Montenegro and the 'bad' Bosnian Serbs. 
So in analysing the warring parties it is first 
necessary to say something about why this choice 
was made in this way. 
Essentially, during the course of 1991, the 
western powers moved from the view that Yugo-
slavia should be kept together to the view that it 
should be encouraged to disintegratt!, and to do so 
on the basis of the proto-national-republics being 
recognised as sovereign states with due provision 
for the civil and human rights of all ethnic minori-
ties. 
The trouble with this view was that it made 
civil war in Croatia and Bosnia a certainty, unless 
there was swift international military intervention to 
impose the outcome in the name of the UN. But no 
country was willing to go to such lengths. Indeed 
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there could not have been a lawful case for doing 
so, as the SFRY remained the recognised sovereign 
state entity at the UN; and Serbia and Montenegro, 
which had rejected secession and the constitution-
ally dubious methods by which Slovenia and 
Croatia had acted, claimed to represent the con-
tinuing federation. Given that these two republics 
made up almost half of the population of the 
SFRY, and that large minorities ofSerbs in Croatia 
and Bosnia opposed the secession of the rep ubi ics 
in which they lived, there was great dubiety about 
the legality and the morality of the policy chosen 
by the Europeans, and followed initially by the US. 
To the detached observer the logic seemed to 
be this. As the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 de-
legitimises non-negotiated changes in the frontiers 
of states, the use of force is ruled out. As it has 
been decided to extend recognition to republics of 
the SFRY requesting verification of their constitu-
tional provisions (including those for minorities), 
the Serbs and Serbia, being unwilling to accept this 
groundwork for the legal dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
are denied national self-determination. Even though 
they were the founding nation of Yugoslavia, they 
are everywhere to be depicted as the agents 
causing the civil wars which are liable to ensue 
from the implementation of this approach. 
The actions of the international community, led 
by the Europeans, were even more artificial and 
contrived. Even while offering to grant 'national' 
self-determination and sovereign statehood to 
republics which barely or only recently constituted 
'nations' in any accepted meaning of that word, 
most importantly Macedonia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina, the EC bypassed its own criteria for 
recognition. These criteria included the creation of 
viable constitutions and entrenched provisions for 
protecting the rights of minorities. In Croatia, 
where the Serbian minority was unwilling to accept 
Croatian citizenship (and where indeed the Ortho-
dox Serbs could not meet the definition of a Croat 
promulgated by the Croatian parliament), recogni-
tion was extended and announced despite the 
existence of a civil war and a heavily contested 
plan to deploy a UN peacekeeping presence. 
The case of Bosnia-Hercegovina was even 
more blatantly incendiary. Having recognised 
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Slovenia and Croatia, and declared that Macedonia 
met its criteria for recognition (despite being a 
desperately poor and heavily contested territorial 
entity), the Europeans and the US decided to 
extend recognition to Bosnia on the basis of a 
referendum which had been boycotted by the 
Serbs, and which clearly infringed existing consti-
tutional conventions of the republic requiring a 
consensus among all three constitutive ethnic 
peoples. As one authority on the subject has 
written: 
The constitution of BiH specifically required 
consensus on oil matters dealing with the 
strategic issues of state sovereignty, independ-
ence, and inter-ethnic relations. (Crnobrnja 
1994:174) 
Under the constitution of the SFR Y Serbs and 
Croats had their identities as parts of larger nations. 
Slav-muslims had their identity as a nationality (ie. 
a recognised people, but not possessing a 'home 
republic' within the SFRY. That not unimportant 
aspect of constitutional legality was ignored, 
despite the clear intention of both Bosnian Serbs 
and Bosnian Croats to join with their mother 
nations in the event of Yugoslavia ceasing to be a 
common state. Yet the international community 
also ignored the preference for keeping the SFRY 
in being as a looser confederation, which had been 
supported during negotiations between the repub-
lics in 1991 by the Bosnian president, Alija 
lzetbegovic, on behalf of the trinational presidency 
comprising Serbs, Croats and Slav-muslims. 
Having fitted up an answer required to appear 
consistent with their own flawed logic and irre-
sponsibly rushed timetable, namely a vote by 60 
per cent of the population ofBosnia-Hercegovina in 
favour of independence, the EC and US, unable to 
agree a joint course of action, by their disagree-
ment virtually guaranteed that civil war would 
break out in Bosnia. Washington commanded 
president Izetbegovic to withdraw his consent and 
signature from a peace plan negotiated by Jose 
Cuteliero, appointed as its mediator by the EC to 
succeed Lord Carrington, who had resigned in 
disgust and dismay over the previous conduct of 
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major European governments. This orphaned EC 
plan had been accepted by all three Bosnian 
groups. it would have reconstituted Bosnia on the 
basis of three territorially distinct parts, each 
governed by one of the ethnic groups. Its rejection 
in Washington, as with proposals later put forward 
by Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg, made sure 
that the war in Bosnia would be protracted as well 
as vicious. (Giitman 1996:69-70) 
That such a civil war would break out, and that 
it would pit all thre~ groups against each other, 
was clear despite the apparently convincing 
majority in favour of independence. The referen-
dum on independence had been boycotted by the 
Serbs (around one-third of the population). The 
Croats (around twenty per cent) voted for inde-
pendence against their widely stated preference 
(union with Croatia) only as a temporary expedient, 
because Croatia intended to refuse any substantial 
measures of autonomy to its own Serbs, who 
might have been able to use the Bosnian model 
negotiated by Cuteliero to strengthen their own 
case. Indeed the hypocrisy of the western powers 
went much further: for almost a year after the 
beginning of the civil war, international attention 
focused on the campaigns of ethnic cleansing 
conducted by the Serbs in Bosnia, ignoring the 
deadly campaigns being conducted by Croats and 
Slav-muslims against each other in central Bosnia 
and western Hercegovina, and by the Croats and 
Serbs in Croatia. 
This war, as most wars do, suspended moral 
categories in time, reserving them to be reinvoked 
in the aftermath. In this sense it is the victors who 
write history. But what if there are no victors? Or, 
still worse, what if the side which is presumptively 
chosen as 'good' fails to triumph, and the side that 
has been deemed 'bad' actually thrives? For more 
than three years the international community 
refused to intervene decisively to underpin the 
outcomes it had sought to propound. And when in 
I 995 it did at last intervene, it was to decisively 
entrench a set of morally indefensible outcomes. 
Plus 9a change, plus c 'est la meme chose. 
Before and during the Yugoslav War of Succession 
the great powers quarrelled among themselves, 
picked sides, defined competing as well as com-
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mon interests, and persistently intervened -as did 
numerous other powers - covertly to shape the 
course of the civil war (which therefore became an 
international war), while paying lip-service to the 
concepts of law, justice, and unity under the UN. 
So who in this drama of escalating national 
separatisms were the chief actors: what did they 
stand for; and what did they achieve at the end of 
the day? 
In Serbia Slobodan Milosevic had employed 
nationalist sentiment to push aside more senior 
figures who relied more on Yugoslavism as a 
formula for approaching the management of 
growing inter-republican and intra-republican 
conflicts. He was influenced by his rising popular-
ity among nationalist Serbs. who in the autono-
mous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and in 
the Serbian areas of Croalia and later Bosnia. These 
Serbs feared that the breakup of Yugoslavia, or of 
Serbia itself, might imminently jeopardize them. 
Milosevic was also greatly influenced by the 
'Memorandum on the position of Serbia within 
Yugoslavia', published by a group of intellectuals 
connected to the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts. This group included both long-standing 
members of the LCY, and former dissidents such 
as the notable poet and writer Dobrica Cosic, later 
to become first president of the FRY, who had 
been indicted for subversion of the state during the 
Tito era. 
The 'Memorandum' has been represented as a 
'programme for the creation of Greater Serbia'. it 
contended that ifYugoslavia broke up - which the 
group of authors did not advocate - then Serbia 
should pursue the same aim of national self-
determination within a single state that other 
nations and nationalities were bound to aspire to. 
Explicitly, therefore, the argument was that the 
internal boundaries of the Yugoslav republics, 
which had been designed to produce an internal 
balance among the three largest ethnic groups in 
Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, namely 
Serbs, Croats and Slav-muslims, would need to be 
renegotiated. The authors of the document also 
foresaw, as a more immediately pressing set of 
issues, that the constitution and political structure 
of the SFRY would need to be altered in the face 
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of mounting economic disparities between the 
more and less rapidly growing regions, and in view 
of rising ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs 
in the economically deprived Serb-populated 
regions of the republic ofCroatia. (Crnobrnja 
1994:97-100) 
This was a highly ethnocentric approach, 
which explicitly returned to the concept of historic 
Serbian national identity. But in itself it was neither 
a programme nor a preference: the ethos of the 
Academy remained, until after the SFRY was no 
more, the last bastion of Yugoslavism and socialism 
in former-Yugoslavia. What it did advocate, how-
ever, was a tough-minded stance over economic 
resources, the restructuring of the federation, and 
the position of the Serbian nation within the SFRY. 
In essence it envisaged a strengthening of the 
federation through a strengthening of Serbdom. 
This was unacceptable to others, initially the 
non-Serb populations of Vojvodina and Kosovo, 
whose autonomous status as quasi-republics within 
Serbia and in the presidency of the SFRY had 
made them independent fiefdoms. The logic by 
which Milosevic and his supporters proceeded was 
that what the Serbian legislature had granted, it 
could also revoke. In the case ofVojvodina, whose 
leadership was largely Serbian anyway, mass rallies 
indicted the provinCial leadership for corruption, 
inducing its resignation and replacement by one 
that was completely amenable to Belgrade. In 
Kosovo, where an increasingly ambitious move-
ment for union with Albania existed, strikes led to 
the granting of emergency powers by the federal 
government to the JNA. In those circumstances 
the Kosovo Assembly was pressurised by Serbia to 
vote to end its autonomous status. While tl1e other 
republics might have looked uncomfortably on as 
this was implemented in early 1989, they did not 
object on constitutional grounds, and indeed cited 
the Serbian precedent in subsequent intra-republi-
can and inter-republican dealings. It was a useful 
one, given the power political proclivities of the 
elites now pursuing increasingly divergent courses. 
But the other republican leaderships were alarmed 
that, having extinguished the unusually extensive 
autonomies of these two provinces, the Serbian 
leadership did not sacrifice their separate and equal 
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representation in the presidency of the SFRY, but, 
rather, contended that this would have to await 
constitutional reform of the state. 
Vojvodina was not heavily suppressed, bur 
parties agitating for an east-European style political 
revolution in Serbia were closed down, and Hun-
garian and other minority language freedoms in 
education and other areas of social life were 
rescinded. 
In Kosovo the situation was, and remains, very 
different. Essentially the army ran the province. 
There was no short-term alternative: Serb-Albanian 
relations had become as embittered as Protestant-
Catholic relations in Northern Ireland at the culmi-
nating point of Protestant ascendancy in the early 
1970s. One common feature of these two situa-
tions was the prospective demographic triumph of 
one community over the other despite, and partly 
because of, impoverishment which induced it to 
breed in idleness. But if once not so long ago 
Catholic urban areas of Northern Ireland still 
contained many slums unrebuilt from the last war, 
Pristina and the concentrated populaces of Kosovo 
in the 1990s are much closer to the third world -
Cairo, perhaps -where nothing in the overloaded. 
worn-out, physical infrastructure works success-
fully twice in succession, and people therefore 
adapt to complete unreliability by becoming com-
pletely unreliable. Pristina, like Cairo, is better than 
the unproviding hinterland. Both, as Northern 
Ireland once was, are tinder-boxes where the 
Army does what it can to preserve a degree of 
order in public places like railway stations. But 
with young women available for young soldiers for 
little more than letting the family onto an anyway 
impossibly crowded train without tickets, how can 
that order be reliable, or respected? 
Kosovo's secessionist movement is strong 
underground. While it has achieved little, and lacks 
the same political support afforded to Slovenia and 
Croatia by western powers, its passive role during 
the unfolding Yugoslav War of Succession forced 
the Serbian leadership to choose between all-out 
support for the Serbian Krajina in Croatia, and this 
cradle of Serbian national identity. If these condi-
tions are not to constitute another civil war, then 
Kosovo demands a programme of economic and 
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social developm~:nt that is beyond the resources of 
war-weakened Serbia, and that can be designed 
and implemented, therefore, only with the coopera-
tion of the great powers and international organisa-
tions such as the OSCE. 
Where the Serbian case excited far greater 
opposition during Yugoslavia's breakdown was 
over strengthening the central powers of the 
federation in economic affairs, and extending 
power over Serbs outside Serbia. But with Serbs 
comprising at least 15 per cent of the population of 
the Croatian republic (probably more if one counts 
those in temporary emigration abroad), and at least 
33 per cent of the population ofBosnia-
Hercegovina, and with Montenegro reinvoking its 
basic kindred identity to Serbdom, there was a 
substantial case to be made for national self-
determination outside but not inside Yugoslavia. 
This has led a number of those looking at the 
issues to conclude that the Serbian leadership 
decided to destroy the SFRY, but the available 
evidence and the considerations brought to bear in 
this paper suggest the opposite. 
Despite the rise of Serbian and other national-
isms inside Yugoslavia, the issue of national 
separatisms did not arise until after the collapse of 
the federation's economic reform strategy, and the 
more or less simultaneous collapse of attempts to 
negotiate a continuing confederation acceptable to 
Serbia. From that point in time, in March I 99 I, 
Serbia's policies in the 'battle of the republics' 
became gradually more forceful. 
S lovenia and Croatia at the same time became 
much more recalcitrant about the economic and 
constitutional conditions under which they would 
accept any reformed Yugoslav constitution. Until 
DEMOS, with its right-wing nationalist parties 
entered the government in I 990, the Slovenian 
model had aimed at economic rather than political 
sovereignty within a refashioned confederation, 
essentially insisting on 'republicanising' the LCY; 
greatly diminishing the subsidising of the slower-
growing republics; cutting the costs of the JNA; 
and limiting the competences of the federal authori-
ties in economic and legal affairs. Thereafter, with 
the national-separatist Christian Democrats holding 
the post of prime minister, Slovenia set a new 
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course for itself that was far more obdurate and 
prone to extra-constitutional risk-taking. During the 
second half of I 990 this included refusing various 
rulings of the federal constitutional court; promul-
gating 'sovereign' laws (while declaring that being 
part of a reformed Yugoslavia was intended); and 
ignoring well-documented evidence produced by 
the JNA that Slovenian militias were receiving arms 
from abroad, and preparing to fight against federal 
forces. (Cohen I 993 :202) 
This in turn faced Croatia's republican-national-
ists with a complex dilemma; associating with the 
more radical nationalists in Slovenia (as national-
separatist Croats returning from abroad, like 
Defence Minister Gojko Susak urged); or tempo-
rising with Serbia and the Serbs in Croatia. Opinion 
survey evidence indicates that Franjo Tudjman as 
president of the republic became more popular the 
harder his line towards Serbia in the battle of the 
republics, and the more intransigent he was 
towards the Krajina Serbs, who exercised effective 
control over much of the country and were 
blockading trade and tourist traffic. But this 
opinion survey evidence must be treated with great 
caution, because the Croatian media were no 
longer free and the regime in Zagreb (as in Bel-
grade) was mounting an intense war of words and 
images. But when after ten exhausting, stalemated, 
meetings of the federal presidency with the presi-
dents of the republics in the period January-March 
I 99 I resulted in S!ovenia declaring that it would no 
longer bargain for even the continuation of a 
'minimal and voluntary confederation of sovereign 
states', a position at least partially coordinated with 
Zagreb, the hand ofCroatian policy was tipped: 
Croatia declared that the republic would 'not stay 
one day longer than Slovene' in the SFRY. (Cohen 
1993: I 98) 
Tudjman was the author of several works on 
Croatian history, including a massive tract, 'Waste-
lands of Historical Truth', which depicted the Jews 
as a 'holocaust people' (that is to say, they brought 
their fate under the Third Reich and in earlier 
chapters of violent anti-semitism upon themselves), 
and explained away, by minimisation, the extensive 
massacres of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies under the 
wartime Croatian puppet regime of Ante Pavelic. 
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Indeed the HDZ explicitly proclaimed the legiti-
macy of Pavelic's First Independent State of 
Croatia. Streets, schools. squares, 0arb enrl 
monuments began to be renamed, and the uniforms 
and other symbols of the Uvtasbe state reappeared. 
But all of this served to further deepen Croatia's 
dilemma within Yugoslavia. For it alienated the 
Serbs, many of whom had suffered under tl1at 
religiously deformed, regime. The prospect that 
they might have settled for autonomy, which is 
what they had been demanding under their leader 
Jovan Raskovic and his SOS, in parallel with 
Croatia's demands for independence within a loose 
Yugoslav confederation, now all but disappeared. It 
should be clear why: 'The Serbs of Croatia had 
been part of Croatia' s national identity, a legacy 
Tudjman wanted to destroy.' (Silber & Little 
1996:38 I) 
Already in the summer of I 990, he had begun 
issuing minatory threats. The new citizenship and 
nationality legislation being proposed by the 
Croatian parliament clearly threatened the existing 
religious as well as national identity of the Serbs, 
let alone their current ideas about political and 
economic autonomy. Inter-ethnic tensions rose 
dangerously with the appearance of mutually 
antipathetic militias, and attempts by the regime in 
Zagreb to disarm the predominantly Serb-national-
ist police in Knin, the main inland town ofthe 
overwhelmingly Serb populated region of northern 
Dalmatia. 
History- written by victorious Croatia- will 
record that these people, the Orthodox Serbs of the 
Krajinas, were irreconcilable, irrational, and that 
their leaders were madmen. (Gienny 1992:10-1 I) 
Subsequently, with the help of Belgrade, they set 
up their own flimsy mini-republic, the RSK, which 
defied logic and reason for four years and then 
collapsed. ln the summer of I 995 the remaining 
350,000 Serbs who had endured great hardships to 
stay on their lands, fled before a Croatian military 
offensive. 
It is worth recollecting that a great majority of 
the almost one million Serbs who left Croatia 
between I 99 I and 1995 had no more fondness for 
Milosevic's communist Serbia than for fascist 
Croatia, and that virtually all the rural population, 
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by far the greater part of the total Serbian minority, 
however Orthodox and suspicious of their Croat 
neigh hours. were far more deeply attached to their 
land than to any political regime. That is why they 
had remained settled in the republic ofCroatia after 
the Second War. Of course many others were 
socialists, and had fought with the partisans of 
Tito. When re-elected as president of the RSK in 
1993 (the elections were annulled by Belgrade, and 
partly re-run), Milan Babic announced 'the end of 
communism in the Krajina'. Belgrade's representa-
tives were made decidedly unwelcome. Great 
numbers of Croats had also fought the Nazis. 
These important factors had brought Croats and 
Serbs into close postwar propinquity in the cities 
of Croatia; in many of the larger towns of Dalmatia 
where in any case, under Italian wartime adminis-
tration, the inter-religious civil war had been less 
extreme; and even in parts of the countryside. 
Rather, the unleashing of ethnic hatred that trans-
formed the national crisis of the SFR Y into a 
bloodbath began in the republic ofCroatia after the 
election of the HDZ in 1990. With Croatia's UDI in 
June 1991, civil war becamt: unavoidable. Eventu-
ally in December I 991 the fighting was brought to 
a cease-fire, brokered by the UN representative 
Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington, who resigned 
following the premature recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia by the EC. 
it is not clear that extreme national separatisms 
had to prevail in the case of the Croatian republic. 
ln the first place the victory of the HDZ in elec-
tions in 1990 was less clear cut in terms of popular 
votes than of the number of seats it won through 
the electoral arrangements adopted. (Table I 4) 
Secondly, at some future time the history of 
negotiations conducted during the recent war 
between the Serbs of Bosnia and the Krajina with 
the Zagreb regime and the Croats of Hercegovina 
and central Bosnia, chiefly under the auspices of 
Radovan Karadzic and Milan Babic, may eventually 
become clear. But these figures are routinely 
depicted as psychologically unstable 'Serbian 
extreme nationalists'. And there was always a 
controlling Belgrade presence in the RSK despite 
the absence of a regime-party equivalent to that in 
Serbia or Bosnia. Lastly, despite 'inter-state' 
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conflict, there was a clear choice open to the 
Croatian nationalists~ between reconstructing 
Croatia as a multi-ethnic society, and pursuing a 
national separatist state. As one author has ob-
served about the general process of the consolida-
tion of power in the republics after the outbreak of 
civil war: 
Elected leaders in the new states and potential 
states placed priority on consolidating their 
own power and that of their political party by 
taking control of state assets such as the mass 
media, the militGI:V and the police. The [ . .] 
threatening war or uncompleted projects of 
national sovereignty provided the pretext for 
extraordinary executive power and[ . .] emer-
gency rule. (Woodward 1995a:353) 
The key to all of this was the overriding claims of 
military security. Yet when the warring former-
republics and their international interlocutors 
decided that it was time to trade, the conveniently 
aggressive proto-republics that had supposedly 
caused such insuperable difficulties disappeared or 
were severely reduced, and with that went all 
pretence to find autonomy provisions for minori-
ties, consistent with European practice and UN 
charters. That principle has been restated by the 
Dayton agreement, and by the 1996 Zagreb-
Belgrade agreement on mutual recognition. But 
hardly anyone believes that large numbers of 
refugees will return to their former homes. In 
Croatia a reaction against the dictatorial and 
extreme methods of the HDZ has made itself 
apparent in local elections, where in 1995, shortly 
after the triumphant crushing of the RSK, the 
regime lost control over government of the capital, 
Zagreb. (Silber & Little 1996:382) 
The Serbs' aim of achieving national self-
determination if Yugoslavia broke up has been 
frustrated. But Milosevic has managed to preserve 
the territorial integrity of Serbia; to draw closer to 
Montenegro; to gain control over half of Bosnia; 
and to win acknowledgement of the FRY as the 
successor state to the SFRY. At the same time the 
economy of Serbia has been severely weakened, 
and the Serbian Krajinas and the Serb areas of 
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Sarajevo and its surrounding region have been 
forsaken: 'The collapse of the economy destroyed 
the wealth base of Yugoslavia's once strong and 
highly developed professional middle class, and at 
the same time gave rise to a powerful new elite 
[ ... ]' (Silber & Little 1996:383) 
In Bosnia Alija lzetbegovic had published again 
in 1990 a tract he first wrote in prison, the 'Islamic 
Declaration'. This contended that the Slav-muslim 
people of Bosnia, having attained recognition of 
their identity as a nationality within Yugoslavia 
during the 1970s, must continue to struggle for the 
establishment of their own islamic institutions. 
lzetbegovic, unlike the leaders of many other 
warring parties, had never been a communist, and 
loathed Tito's godless society. But that did not 
mean that he rejected outright a future for the Slav-
muslim people ofBosnia within Yugoslavia. Indeed 
it was the non-communists within the SFRY who 
took most heart from the collapse of communism 
elsewhere, offering something between passive 
acceptance of the prevailing state and a dangerous 
search for independence. In this; for a time, he 
made common cause with Kiro Gligorov of 
Macedonia, and might have had more support from 
Montenegro had the issue of the Albanian and 
Turkish minorities in the Sanjak/Metohia not 
pushed the position of that republic into firm 
alignment with Serbia. (Cmobmja 1994: 147-8,217) 
lzetbegovic made clear that even as an absolute 
majority of the population ofBosnia, the Slav-
muslims would not be able to islamicise its state 
and society; for that to happen would require 
maybe 70 per cent or 80 per cent predominance. 
Moreover it seems that before the Yugoslav na-
tional crisis began to encourage national 
separatisms he was not in any sense an 'islamic 
fundamentalist'. While believing in the long-term 
building of an islamic society across Bosnia, and in 
the mutual incompatibility of islamic and western 
institutions, he was not committed to a theocratic 
model of the islamic state, but to something more 
like modern Turkey or Egypt. But because so 
much of his written thought is general, abstract 
and allusive, it is difficult to be precise about what 
course he would have pursued in more auspicious 
circumstances. 
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In any case the overriding need for the Slav-
muslims to find allies who would help them to fight 
the Serbs and Croats dashed his hopes for a 
peaceful long-term transformation in Bosnia, and 
turned his own position into one of presiding 
symbolically more than authoritatively over the 
affairs of his government. That government 
contained a number of powerful younger figures 
such as Haris Siladzic and Ejup Ganic, who knew 
the US or had been educated in American institu-
tions abroad. Aside from the capacity this afforded 
to lobby the American government and Congress 
on an inside track, it is certain that Izetbegovic's 
imprisonment and the strength of his movement 
had attracted the attention of agencies of the US 
government, including the CIA, in what was, after 
all, a country within which during the cold war a 
political crisis might have induced a superpower 
confrontation. This may help explain why the Slav-
muslim cause proved so popular in the American 
media. 
It is also important that, particularly after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush administra-
tion's policy on 'Bosnia' had the Gulf War of 
I 990-91 and the continuing problem of Iraq much 
in mind. Consequently it was much more disposed 
to help, as well as to constrain, its Turkish NATO 
ally, which took a Strongly interventionist view of 
the threat of civil war in the republic. And in 
general the Pentagon and NSC increasingly viewed 
the national crisis and unfolding ethnic confronta-
tion in former-Yugoslavia in terms of eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East interests, rather 
than in the European perspective which predomi-
nated in western Europe. 
Much more difficult to explain is why 
Izetbegovic and his movement allied themselves 
with the Croats against the Serbs before civil war 
spread to Bosnia. After coming to power in 
Zagreb, president Tudjman had made numerous 
references to dividing Bosnia in order that the 
separatist Croatian regions could join with Croatia. 
But Izetbegovic also knew, and was repeatedly 
reminded by Radovan Karadzic and other Serb 
leaders in the Bosnian Assembly and presidency, 
that civil war would be the consequence of the 
pursuit of independence without the assent of the 
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Serbs; whereas the Croat position favoured seces-
sion from the SFR Y. Moreover, the Serbs de-
manded that if the SFR Y broke up they should 
exercise self-determination and union with Serbia. 
In any circumstances short of that they wanted 
guarantees of their status as a minority in a repub-
lic in which they had once been a majority. 
Izetbegovic and the Serbian president of the 
Bosnian Assemble, Momcilo Krajsnic continued a 
private dialogue about these possible outcomes 
virtually to the last moment in mid-Aprill992, 
when serious fighting was about to commence 
across the barricades which had sprang up during 
the previous month between the Muslim and Serb 
suburbs of Sarajevo, and when snipers and militia-
men were about to completely take over the 
streets. The two men talked over Karadzic's offer 
of a compromise to halt the impending tragedy; the 
division of the city between the two communities. 
(Silber & Little I 996:225) 
It seems likely that on the level of intra-republi-
can politics the availability of a working alliance 
with the Croats, and the minatory rhetoric of the 
Serbs, combined to keep Izetbegovic and the SDA 
in alignment with the tactics of the Croats, how-
ever uncomfortably. A deal with Karadzic at that 
time would have disrupted the alliance. Thus we 
can see that Izetbegovic and his people feared 
Serbian domination, and knew that a Slav-muslim 
society would only be achievable if Serbdom in 
Bosnia continued to weaken demographically. But 
that was not an immediate prospect, except 
through war or, possibly, the coercive use of state 
power. So did he think that course might have 
worked? 
The most plausible explanation oflzetbegovic's 
actions during this period is that at least from the 
rejection of the Cuteliero plan onwards, and 
probably much beforehand, he acted at the behest 
of the American government, which had promised 
effective assistance following independence. That 
assistance took the form of UN Security Council 
resolutions ordering the JNA out of Bosnia, and 
imposing economic sanctions on the FRY. 
By that time the killing was well underway in 
the countryside of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Unlike 
Croatia the year before this had not been significant 
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before independence. But the withdrawing JNA left 
behind huge stockpiles of armaments. In any case 
Bosnia was covered with arms dumps, part of 
Yugoslavia's national defence provisions. 
(Woodward 1995a:27) These arms were intended 
for use by the TD forces, and so many of the 
locations of the stockpiles were known to local 
commanders. Bosnian Serb officers and men were 
allowed by the acting-presidency of the SFRY (the 
FRY was constituted on 27 April 1992) to 
remuster to their home republic, where they joined 
the Serb units of the former Bosnian TD. These 
Serb units had been ordered by the president of the 
republic, lzetbegovic, to report with their weapons 
to Slav-muslim and Croat controlled central 
organising points around Sarajevo, where undoubt-
edly they would have been disarmed and quite 
possibly interned. (Silber & Little !996:225) This 
order they disobeyed, on the grounds that the 
conventions providing the authority for the collec-
tive presidency governing Bosnia-Hercegovina had 
been broken. 
Hence the warring parties in Bosnia faced each 
other over constitutional as well as territorial and 
ethnic issues, and, like Hobbes' state of nature, 
each was vulnerable to the other and both were too 
insecure not to seek immediate military advantage. 
Equally, therefore, the movement of the JNA out 
of Bosnia-Hercegovina ordered by the great 
powers acting in the name of the UN removed the 
only force which would have been capable of 
policing the country in its entirety. Despite allega-
tions to the contrary, and strong evidence of a 
mounting pro-Serb bias in its actions and direction, 
the JNA had been doing this. (Silber & Little 
1996:224) Preventing the militias from unleashing 
terrible vengeful killing on each others' communi-
ties, as had occurred in Croatia in 1991, now 
became impossible. (Tables 6-7) Contributing to 
the ensuing mayhem were at least 15,000 Croatian 
regular forces and equipment, sent into Bosnia by 
the State Defence Council of Croatia. These forces 
were not ordered out of Bosnia by the UN. 
Recognition by the international community and 
resolutions by the UN therefore provided the 
incentive, if not the motive or justification, for a 
concerted military effort by Croats and Serbs alike 
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to destroy Bosnia as a feasible unitary state; the 
political motive and legal grounding, but not the 
military means or moral justification, for the Slav-
muslim SDA and its militias to fight for the control 
over a unitary state; and an answer to the JNA 's 
search for a country, since the interventionary 
operations of the great powers now placed Serbia 
in thrall to war, demanding a High Command 
structure with which to fight it. Under the Slav-
muslim-Croat tactical alliance, Croat and Slav-
muslim militias hardly ceased fighting each other, 
even in early 1994 when the US and Germany put 
together the 'confederation' of the two entities. 
Croatia's eventual success in regaining the territory 
of the RSK removed its strategic need for the Slav-
muslim alliance, and brought to the fore once again 
the Croatian separatist agenda for Bosnia-
Hercegovina. The US and Germany have proved, 
however, that they can be compelling and insistent 
patrons. Croatia today is uncomfortably con-
strained by powerful allies whose interests are 
unlikely to be served by a renewed Serbo-Croat 
division ofBosnia. Realistically; only the continuing 
presence of !FOR obviates such a development. 
The discussion can now be summarised: 
I. Two models of national separatism within 
the SFRY developed during the late-!980s, in 
Serbia and in Slovenia. 
2. The Serbian model was driven by various 
specifically Serb motivations, but its two most 
obvious external dynamics were the state of the 
economy in Serbia and the growing democratic 
rights and national separatist movements in 
Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
3. The Slovenian model was also intrinsically 
economic rather than political at first, concerned 
with reducing its resource and revenue outflows to 
the rest of the SFRY, but it also had a political 
dimension in that it encouraged the loosening of 
centralisation by the federal state and LCY. 
4. Following the collapse of communist regimes 
elsewhere in eastern Europe, but more importantly 
driven by the failure of federal economic reforms, 
models of separatism }l-am the SFRY developed. 
These were driven by the appearance of a plethora 
of new and sometimes extremist parties contesting 
multi-party democratic elections. But the east 
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European revolutions were in themselves insignifi-
cant in impact; their consequences lay in opening 
the inter-republican politics of the SFRY to western 
influences that proved extremely potent. 
5. Democratic elections also pushed existing 
parties and movements into more intransigent 
positions. As importantly, they diverted attention 
away from the crucial significant of the collapse of 
federal structures, and mounting dissentions within 
the deliberative councils. 
6. Clearly this further energised the inter-
personal policies of elite members and factions 
who were most of all concerned to keep power in 
the inter-republican battles over the future of 
Yugoslavia. 
7. The clear emergence of national separatisms 
was encouraged by democratisation of the political 
process. The dramatic proliferation of political 
parties at republic and sub-republic levels smoth-
ered the last chances for pan-Yugoslav political 
organisations to function. Electoral methods 
intended to produce strong governments did so. 
But these governments were nationalistic and at 
best partially representative of their peoples. 
8. Democratisation also presented a unique set 
of opportunities to emigre groups for whom 
nationalism was more important than democracy, 
and the destruction· of Yugoslavia more important 
than the avoidance of civil war. 
9. The challenge which this situation increas-
ingly posed to the Serbs living in three of the six 
republics, and to Montenegro, was whether to 
accept state-sovereignty on the basis of existing 
inter-republican boundaries, or to strive for national 
self-determination within a single state. 
10. The challenge to Croatia was in some 
respects similar to that posed to Serbia, given 
Croatia's historic links with Bosnia. But the elec-
tion of the HDZ polarised Serbo-Croat relations 
within the republic of Croatia, encouraging national 
separatism by the indigenous Serbs. 
11. Given the rise of confrontation between 
Serbia and Croatia, the situation in Bosnia-
Hercegovina (and other republics) remained 
remarkably stable. But in this case a Slav-muslim 
national separatism was stimulated by multi-party 
elections and by the growing demands of the 
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Bosnian Serbs for inter-Serbian unification. 
12. At this crucial juncture the Slav-muslim 
SDA calculated on external intervention by the 
international community, led by the US, to sustain 
the figmentary sovereignty of the 'state' of Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 
13. The Serbs were alienated by the actions of 
the international community against the collapsing 
SFRY and succeeding FRY, and by the abrogation 
of constitutional conventions in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. 
I 4. Croatian national separatism in Bosnia, and 
with respect to the breakaway RSK, was more 
covert and tactically subtle, but had little in common 
with the Slav-muslim cause. 
15. Political conflicts beginning in economic and 
constitutional issues turned, with the effective 
breakdown of the SFRY through the Slovenian UDI 
in June 1991, into issues of cohabitation, borders, 
legal succession, and security. No obvious answers 
existed, and international mediation ought therefore to 
have commenced with the de facto dominance of the 
republics, a clean sheet of paper, and what the EC 
mediator, Lord Carrington, called "an invitation to 
Yugoslavia a la carte". 
16. The logic offollowingthe 'Siovenian model' 
of UDI, (quickly recognising a country with no 
si!,'llificant national minorities) without allowing for 
adjustments of borders, questions of legal and 
economic succession, or the constitutional entrench-
ment of minority rights in every other republic 
(where there were significant minorities and no 
provisions for these beyond the abandoned federal 
constitution of the SFRY) turned each insecure 
minority into a candidate for national separatism and 
every presumptive majority into a potential minority 
in at least part of its recognised sovereign territory. 
17. With the disintegration and re-nationalisation 
of the JNA by Serbia, and the refusal on the part of 
the international community to send a peacekeeping 
force to Bosnia-Hercegovina in advance of recogni-
tion, the disintegration of the SFRY and the absence 
of any overarching structure of security created 
conditions of such insecurity that a virtual interna-
tional war was bound to break out, and to interact 
with the pre-existing civil war within Croatia, thus 
encouraging all factions to regard war as both a likely 
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outcome and hence as a rational instrument for the 
further pursuit of national separatist aims. 
A compromise solution to the 
disintegration of the SFRV? 
It is worth now briefly summarising the evidence 
accumulated in the various Tables attached to this 
paper, some of which have already been referred 
to. Firstly, there is the striking strength of localism 
and provincialism, balancing a strong attachment to 
the Yugoslav federation in most republics. This 
suggests that a powerful cleavage of loyalties arose 
in the context of social conflict. (Table 11) When 
this is read alongside the overwhelming popular 
wish to see the constitution of the SFRY be 
respected, one is entitled to hypothesise that the 
growing likelihood of war was not supported by 
popular opinion. (Table I 0) 
Even in Croatia and Serbia, multi-ethnic socie-
ties remained widely supported. (Tables 3, 13, 14) 
The preferred models for majorities of the 
populations of these states is shown by something 
beyond the statistics: the facts that, firstly, recruit-
ment into armies was resisted widely, and, sec-
ondly, that most local communities stayed put 
where they lived, despite changing state structures, 
even in highly mixed areas, until they were, in so 
many cases, burnt, beaten and dragooned out of 
their homes, or died where they had lived. 
The greatest tragedy of the Yugoslav War of 
Succession was that interacting consequences of 
economic collapse, democratisation, and the 
abandonment of the overarching state structure of 
the SFRY, opened the way to a war of succession 
in which established elites and new political actors 
employed the rhetoric and images of national 
separatisms to gain, keep or extend their power 
and prestige. Given the near-universal contempt in 
which the defunct SFRY is now held, it is difficult 
to argue with conviction that the civil war was 
entirely avoidable. But if the national separatisms 
which turned the disintegration of the SFR Y into 
war were informed by conscious political logic, 
and if the steps beyond into civil and international 
strife were not obviously popular, then the case 
remains to be made that the war in its actual 
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course was unavoidable. 
The groups which showed the strongest temper 
for war were religious, rural peoples who could 
not of their own resources or thought have swung 
former-Yugoslavia into such a maelstrom of 
blood letting. They had to be assisted to unleash 
their hatreds. And they were the most vulnerable 
and insecure groups to be affected directly by the 
collapse of the SFRY. This is not to look past the 
point about majorities also feeling threatened in 
part of their sovereign expectations. But such 
issues could have been dealt with through negoti-
ated autonomy provisions, as Carrington and 
Vance sought to do: and as David Owen and 
Thorvald Stoltenberg were condemned to continue 
doing in the impossible conditions of later 
bloodletting. 
The denial of the prospect of self-determination 
for all nations sustained the war in its viciousness, 
because the international community, in offering to 
extend recognition to republican governments that 
were not democratically representative of the 
whole people over whom they were being invited 
to rule, and that had not entrenched adequate rights 
for the protection of ethnic and religious minorities, 
revived ancient animosities. (Varady 1995) At the 
same time, the essential feature of the crisis as it 
unfolded through the consolidation of state power 
was that leaders were prepared to resort to war as 
policy. 
Through the course of this war, therefore, 
national minorities have become second-class 
citizens everywhere. There is a partial exception to 
this in the FRY, which may now be the most 
ethnically diverse entity in former-Yugoslavia. Even 
so, the situations in Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohia 
are far from normal. In Croatia itself the rights of 
returning peoples to re-enter their properties and 
reassert their civil and political rights have been 
cancelled by Croatian legislation. Despite the 
language of the Dayton Accords and the Serbo-
Croat agreement of August 1996, probably the best 
that can be hoped for is that some people will in 
due course feel safe enough to return to lands to 
which they feel a deep attachment; and that 
compensation will be afforded to the rest. In 
Sarajevo, where there were six or seven predomi-
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nantly Slav-muslim districts and three that were 
Serb, but where all had a significant multi-ethnic 
and multi-cultural mix, the Serbs have mostly 
gone, and are filtering away from the outlying 
areas too, leaving behind an impoverished, broken, 
wounded Slav-muslim ghetto in what was once 
one of Europe's most cosmopolitan societies. 
The end of consociationalism has not been 
balanced by any improvement in the growth of 
political democracy. The regimes of these new 
states and sub-state entities rule by suppressing 
adversaries. Both Tudjman in Croatia and Milosevic 
in Serbia have sought to reverse the outcome of 
local government elections unfavourable to their 
regimes. Neither of the two regimes in Bosnia 
exercises power democratically or with respect for 
minorities: international agencies report the con-
tinuing, systematic, destruction of properties 
belonging to those who fled the war but might 
have been tempted by the ostensible fairness of the 
peace accords to return. These regimes employ 
uglier means of suppressing freedoms than the 
SFRY was indicted for by its enemies. Numbers of 
the emigres whose influence has been so deadly 
now act as advisors or business people, incorpo-
rated into the new oligarchic power elites. At the 
same time, popular opinion in these new states has 
accepted authoritarian rule and endorsed ethnic 
cleansing. This is perhaps not surprising since the 
sickening toll of murder, and the physical demands 
of reconstruction, have dulled the appetite for 
democracy for the time being. 
An overall conclusion? 
Events in former-Yugoslavia do little to sustain the 
notion that self-determination and nationhood are 
natural or objective outcomes of a popular will, or 
of pre-established racial ethnicity. Rather, as Max 
Weber wrote: 
[ .. ]all those groups who hold the power to 
steer common conduct within a polity will 
strongly instill themselves with[ .. } ideal 
fervour of power prestige[ .. } Insofar as there 
is a common object[ .. ] behind the obviously 
ambiguous term 'nation ', it is apparently 
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located in the field of politics[ . .} A nation is 
a community of sentiment which would ad-
equately manifest itself in a stale of its own; 
hence a nation is a community which normally 
tends to produce a state of its own. (Hutchinson 
& Smith 1994:20) 
Yugoslavia did not experience a political revolution 
led from the streets against a centralised commu-
nist state, as happened elsewhere in eastern Eu-
rope. Only in Croatia was there a significant 
change of regime, though in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
the disintegration of inter-communal political 
management led to the division of the country. 
Even so, these significant popular choices con-
firmed the power of existing elites and leaders. The 
collapse of a weak federal structure and party was 
brought about by external as well as, and more 
than, domestic economic conditions. The logic of 
democratisation was challenged and dominated, 
rather than being complemented, by the logic of 
nationalism. Sentiments of community, myths of 
origin, and dreams of a better future, all played 
their potent roles. But they did so under the driving 
of leaders who manipulated nationalism for their 
own ends, who possessed their own agendas, and 
who took some or even much of their direction 
from powers beyond Yugoslavia. It therefore 
remains an open question, particularly as so many 
of those dreams have turned to bitter ashes, 
whether the national separatisms that arose through 
the disintegration of the SFRY would 'normally' 
have produced communities of sentiment 'ad-
equately manifesting themselves' in ethnically-
cleansed societies. As Sir Michacl Howard once 
wrote about the outbreak of the First World War, 
'if the masses howled for war, it was because they 
had been taught to howl'. 
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Glossary of terms 
CIA 
DEMOS 
EU/EC 
FRY 
HDZ 
HVO 
!FOR 
IMF 
JNA 
LCY 
NATO 
NSC 
OSCE 
RS 
RSK 
SDA 
SOB 
SOS 
SFRY 
SPS 
TD 
UDI 
UN 
us 
WTO 
Central Intelligence Agency ofthe US 
Democratic Opposition Bloc 
(Slovenia) 
European Union/European 
Community 
The Federal Republic ofYugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) 
Croatian Democratic Alliance 
Croatian Defence Council 
Peace Implementation Force 
International Monetary Fund 
Yugoslav National Army 
League of Yugoslav Communists 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
National Security Council of the US 
Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 
Republica Srpska 
Republica Srpska Knijina 
Movement of Democratic Action 
(Bosnia-Hercegovina) 
Security Service of Serbia 
Serbian Democratic Party (RSK and 
RS) 
Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia 
Socialist Party of Serbia 
Territorial Defence Forces (republics 
of the SFRY) 
Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (Slovenia & Croatia) 
United Nations 
United States of America 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
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'li'able 1: Nations, nationalities and 
ethnic groups in Yugoslavia 
(1981 census) (SIFRY) 
% 
Population of SFRY 22.427.585 100 
Natwns of Htgoslavia: 
Croats 4.428.043 19.7 
Macedonians 1.341.598 6.0 
Montcnegrins 579.043 2.6 
Muslims I .999.890 8.9 
Scrbs 8.140.507 36.3 
Slovcnes 1.763.571 7.8 
Nationalities of }'ugosfavia: 
Albanians 1.730.878 7.7 
Bulgarians 36.189 0.2 
Czechs I 9.624 0.1 
Hungarians 426.867 1.9 
Italians 15.132 0.1 
Romanians 54.955 0.2 
Ruthcnians 23.286 0, I 
Slovaks 80.334 0.4 
Turks 101.291 0.5 
Ukranians 12.813 0. I 
Et/mic groups: 
Gypsies 168.197 0.7 
Vlachs 32.071 0. I 
Yugoslavs 1.219.024 5.4 
Ohtcrs 254.272 1,1 
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il'alble 2: Yugoslav c:lliversity 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Croatia 
Macedonia 
Montcnegro 
Slovcnia 
SRSerbia: 
- Serbia proper 
- Kosovo 
- Vojvodina 
Yugoslavia 
Population 1981 
census in OOOs 
4.124 
4.601 
1.909 
584 
1.892 
5.695 
1.585 
2.035 
22.425 
11 
Farmers 
683 
668 
392 
76 
173 
I. 514 
380 
391 
4.277 
Ill IV V 
GDP pr capita Major religions Major languages 
(in per cent of average) 
69 Orth. Cathl. Must Serbo-Croat 
125 Catholic Serbo-Croat 
65 Orthodox, Muslim Macedonian 
77 Orthodox Scrbo-Croat 
197 Catholic Slovcnian 
99 Orthodox Serbo-Croat 
28 Muslim Orthodox Alb., Scrbo-Croat 
121 Orthodox, Catholic Serbo-Croat, Hung. 
il'alble 3: fl))ata on the national (ethnic) composition of the population (IFIR!Y) 
Serbia 
I Serbs 6.428.420 
2 Montcncgrins 140.024 
3 Albanians 1.686.661 
4 Hungarians 345.376 
5 Yugoslavs 317.739 
6 Muslims 237.358 
7 Gypsies 137.265 
8 Croats 109.214 
9 Slovaks 67.234 
I 0 Macedonians 47.577 
11 Romanians 42.386 
12 Bulgarians 25.214 
13 Ruthenians 18.339 
14 Vlachs 17.557 
15 Turks 11.50 I 
16 Slovencs 8.340 
17 Regional affiL 4.881 
18 Others 44.866 
19 Undetermined 16.661 
20 Unknown 61.278 
36 
Montenegro 
57,176 
380.484 
40.880 
25.854 
89.932 
Total FRY 
6.485.596 
520.508 
1.727.541 
345.376 
343.593 
327.290 
137.265 
6.249 115.463 
860 
407 
13A25 
67.234 
48.437 
42.386 
25214 
18.339 
17,557 
11.501 
8.784 
4.881 
58.291 
16.661 
61.278 
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Table 4: INiational composition of the Yugoslav !People's Army (JINIA) 
Nationality Total population (%) JNA officers (%) 
Montenegrins 2,5 6,2 
Croats 22,1 12,6 
Macedonians 5,8 6,3 
Muslims 8,4 2,4 
Slovenes 8,2 2,8 
Scrbs 39,7 60,0 
Albanians 6,4 0,6 
Hungarians 2,3 0,7 
Yugoslavs ( 1981) 1,3 0,7 
Others 3,3 1,6 
Estimated number of 
JNA officers 
4873 
9903 
4952 
1886 
2201 
47160 
472 
550 
5266 
1258 
'l!'alble 5: !Public attitudes towards financing the Yugoslav People's Army (..UINIAJ in mid-1990 
How much money 
should the JNA get? Tot. Mont Croat. Maced. Slav. Serbia. Kosovo Vojvod. Bosnia Hcrzeg. 
Less than now 36,0 10,0 54,0 28,0 78.0 18,0 65,0 21,0 24.0 
About the same 39,0 56,0 33,0 47,0 10,0 51.0 18.0 52,0 41,0 
More than now 16,0 24,0 6,0 16,0 3,0 23,0 9,0 20,0 24,0 
Don't know 9,0 10,0 8,0 9,0 9,0 9,0 9,0 7,0 11,0 
Total 100 lOO 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
"'!"alble 6: Territorial armies (estimate) 
Sovereign state Population %in SFRY Army Total operational 
Bosnia~Herzegovina 4.365.639 18,6 372.000 120.000 
Montencgro 616.327 2,7 52.000 17.000 
Croatia 4.763.941 20,31 406.000 135.000 
Macedonia 2.033.964 8,7 174.000 60.000 
Slovcnia 1.974.839 8,4 168.000 60.000 
Serbia 9.721.177 41.4 823.000 270.000 
Estimate of the size of potential protectors of republicun sovereignty were made according to available data on reserve JNA units and 
territorial defence conscripts. The figures should be taken with a grain of saiL. since the numerical potential of certain \cannies>> was 
derived on the basis of the population census rather than national affiliation, 
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il'alble 7: Strength of the armed forces on former Yugoslavia territory 
soldiers tanks artillery aircraft helicopters 
Bosnian Muslims I IO.OOO 40 400 
Bosninn Croats 50.000 75 200 
Croats I IO.OOO I70 900 20 (including helicopters) 
Bosnian Serbs 80.000 330 800 40 30 
Krajina Scrbs 50.000 240 500 I2 6 
FRY I 25.000 600 I500 200 IOO 
il'alble S: Principal political leaders in Yugoslavia (Jianuary-May 1991) 
Republic President Age 
Bosn ia-Herzegovina Alija lzetbcgovic 76 Moslem fundamentalist/anti-communist 
Croatia Franjo Tudjman 69 Croatian nationalist/communist 
Slovcnia Milan Kucan 50 Slovenc regional nationalist/refOrm communist 
Macedonia Kiro Gligorov 77 Macedonian regional nationalist/refOrm communist 
Serbia Slobodan Miloscvic 49 Serbian nationalist/communist 
Montenegro Momir Bu\atovic 35 Scrbo-Montencgrin nationalist/communist 
Fed. prime minister Ante Markovic 68 Yugoslav/reform communist 
Fed. president Borislav Jovic1 63 Serbian nationalist/communist 
Fed. vice~presidcnt Stipe Mesic2 57 Croatian nationalist/communist 
1 Resigns post on March 15, 1991, over presidency's failure to adopt emergency measures against Croatin and Slovcnia. Resumes 
post on March 20. 
~Scheduled to become president of collective state presidency on May 15, 1991, but blocked by Serbia and its allies. Assumes post 
of president on June 30, after compromise negotiated by European Community. 
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Table 9: Number of Yugoslav citizens to identify themselves as uVugoslav» In the 
1981 and 1991 censuses 
1981 1991 
Bosnia-Hcrzcgovina 326.280 7,9% 239.845 5,5% 
Slovenia 26.263 1.4% 12.237 0,6% 
Croatia 379.058 8,2% 104.728 2.2% 
Macedonia 15.673 0,7% 
fo.·lllillCIICgrO 31 .:243 5,3% 25.854 4,0% 
Serbia propcr2 272.195 4,8% 145.810 2,5% 
Vojvodina1 164.880 8,2% 168.859 8,4% 
Kosovo 2.676 0,2% 3.070 0,2% 
1 The first results of the censuses in Macedonia did not report data on 1( Yugoslavs>). 
:! Without the prm'inccs v~-:;·" .. !:::;• :!nd KnsOYO. 
Change 1981-1991 
-26,5% 
-53,4% 
-72,3% 
-17,3% 
-16,4% 
2,4% 
14.7%4 
1 53% of all the <(YugoslaVS>) in the republic of Serbia arc in the province of Vojvodina, amd persons declaring that identity made 
up !0% or more of the population in eight of Vojvodina's municipalities. 
4 Information fOr Kosovo is incomplete because almost all Albanians (obout 90% of the province) boycotted the census, The 
growth rate of Yugoslavs in the province reflecL<; a small increase in their absolute number, most likely among inhabitatns of 
Serbian and Montenegrin background. 
Figure 1 0: !Federal versus republican constitutions: ll"er cent of sample agreeing 
that the federal constitution must be paramount, 1990 
K osovo 
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"ll"alble 11: The personal attachment of citizens in VugcsDavia to different Bevels of 
terrctiral organization, May-Jiune 1990 (in per cent)' 
Level of territorial afliliation 
Ethnic group Local Rcpublicnn/provinci ut Yugoslavia 
Slovcncs 51 66 26 
Croats 45 51 48 
Macedonians 31 52 68 
Moslems 43 50 84 
Yugoslavs 25 32 71 
Montcnegrins 37 47 80 
Scrbs 36 51 71 
Albanians 48 47 49 
Hungarians 60 62 79 
Others 37 43 58 
Total sample 39 52 62 
1 Per cent of respondents in each ethnic group who felt a particular level of affiliation was "quite important" for them personally. 
Based on interviews \Vilh 4230 randomly sampled adults throughout the country. 
"ll"alble 12a: ll"ercentage of young people "ll"alble 121b: ll"articipaticn of young people 
prefering net joining the ILeague of in membership of the ll.eague of ICcmmu· 
!Communists nists (in per cent) 
B!,;:i'illll 121::1 1286 1282 Region 1976 1980 1984 1988 1989 
Slovenia 32 88 92 Slovcnia 27,7 26,0 16,6 8,3 7,6 
Croatia 13 70 75 Croatia 24,7 26,2 18,7 7,1 
Vojvodina 4 54 50 Vojvodina 31,2 28,9 20,7 14,0 13,2 
Scrbia1 6 40 42 Scrbia2 32,5 33,3 24,8 16,3 15,8 
Macedonia 7 40 42 Macedonia 20,9 25,3 20,2 12, I I 0,3 
Bosnia~Herzcgovina 5 36 40 Bosnia-Hcrz. 36,0 41,2 33,6 20,2 17,8 
Kosovo 4 35 33 Kosovo 35,3 40,7 37,8 35,7 34,0 
t-.·lontcncgro 8 18 34 Montencgro 30,2 25,0 28,6 22,5 22,8 
Total League 
Total Yugoslavia 9 50 51 of Communists 30.8 33.1 25.3 16.1 15.8 
1 Not including the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. ' Unvailablc. 
z Not including the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
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Table 13: Political parties in Yugoslavia, December 1990, lby dominant goal 
orientation (in per cent) 
Predominant Goal 
Orientation of Bosnia- All 
Party Program' Slovenia Croatia Herzegovina Serbia Montenegro Macedonia Republics 
Communist and socialist 12,7 11,9 18,6 10,5 40,0 16,0 16,3 
Liberal-democratic 22,1 16,6 23,2 21,0 20,0 8,0 19,2 
Labour/farmer/business 8,5 7,1 13,9 10,5 4,1 16,0 10,0 
Ethn. pol./rel./regional 14,8 40,4 23,2 33,3 24,0 36,0 28,4 
Spcsial interest'- 31,9 14,2 6,9 10,5 4,0 8,9 15,0 
Yugoslav state unity 2,1 2,3 13,9 1,7 4,0 4,0 4,6 
Other 8,5 7,1 12,2 4,0 6,2 
Total lOO 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of parties ( 4 7) (4 2) (43) (57) (25) (25) (239) 
1 The breakdown is intended to illustrate general tendencies of Yugoslavia's emergent pluralist party system, based upon the 
predominant beliefs or organizing principllcs of parties and disregarding significant overlap in orientations and differences among 
the parties with respect to size and inOuence. 
1 Parties organized to advance specific interests (e.g. the environment, peace, women, pensioners, unemployed, consumers, human 
rights culture). 
Table 14: The Croatian elections of 1990: Voting and distribution of seats for the 
Sociopolitical Chamber of the Sabor 
The Croatian Democratic 
Alliance (HDZ) 
The League of Communists 
(SKH-SDP) and smaller 
parties of the left 
Serbian Democratic Party 
Centrist Coalition and others 
Total 
Voter turnout (in %) 
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First Round 
Total % 
1,200,691 41,8 
994,060 34,5 
46,418 1.6 
633,892 22.0 
2,875,061 100.0 
845 
Second Round Seats won 
Total % Total % 
708,007 42,2 54 67,5 
627,345 37,3 19 23,7 
34,682 2.0 1.2 
308,378 18.3 6 7.5 
1,678,412 100.0 80 100.0 
74.5 
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!Figure 15: Social product per capita by region, 1947 and 1974 
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Table 16: Yugoslavia's !Economic Growth, '1956·1984: Selected indicators 
Average Annual Gr0\\-1h Rate (%) 
Indicalors 1 1956-64 1965-7' 1973-79 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 8,8 6,0 6,1 
GDP per capita 7,7 5,0 5,1 
GPO in industry 12,2 6,6 7,5 
GPD in agriculture 3,6 2,0 2,2 
Labour productivity in 
the public sector 4,8 4,3 2,7 
Real personal incomes 6,3 6,1 2, 7 
1 !972 Prices. 
42 
1980-84 
0,4 
-0,3 
2,1 
2,9 
·2,0 
-2,0 
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!Figure 17: IFieal net personal income per capita Yugoslavia, 1952·1988 
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